Which countries have deepened bilateral ties with China or regional blocs since Trump’s return, and why?
Executive summary
Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, a range of states — from traditional U.S. partners like Japan, India, Australia and Britain to regional neighbors in the Asia‑Pacific and a swath of Global South countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Russia — have moved to deepen or restore working ties with Beijing for pragmatic economic engagement, hedging against perceived U.S. unpredictability, and to pursue regional strategic aims [1] [2] [3].
1. U.S. partners recalibrating: Japan, India, Australia and Britain
Tokyo, New Delhi and Canberra have shown improving relations with Beijing even as Washington seeks to re-engage them; Japanese trade frictions eased when China began lifting its seafood import ban and sought to improve ties with Japan in 2024 [2], while reporting notes ties with India and Australia are “improving” in the wake of Trump’s unilateralist turn as those governments weigh economic interests and regional stability [1]; Britain under Prime Minister Keir Starmer has also publicly sought to rebuild ties with Beijing following electoral change [1].
2. Asia‑Pacific neighbors and Oceania: pragmatic proximity
China has prioritized neighborly outreach across Southeast Asia and Oceania: leaders from Vietnam, Myanmar and Indonesia visited Beijing in 2024 as part of a sustained diplomatic push, China extended visa‑free travel for New Zealanders and reinforced people‑to‑people links via language and cultural programs, and Beijing strengthened relations with a dozen Pacific island states on sovereignty and development terms [4] [5].
3. The Global South and BRICS‑adjacent moves: Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Turkey
Public and elite currents in Brazil, South Africa, Russia and Turkey increasingly view closer China ties as realistic and desirable, a trend reinforced by Beijing’s development diplomacy and appeals to multipolarity; European Council polling and commentary indicate majorities in those countries expect stronger ties with China and see it as a necessary partner or ally [3] [6] [7].
4. Economics first: trade, supply chains and the BRI continuum
Practical economics remains the dominant engine: even where political partnerships shifted (Italy left the BRI), bilateral trade with China rose in 2024, and Beijing has accepted “backdoor” trade patterns in which Chinese inputs feed exports assembled elsewhere, allowing China’s export strength and large trade surplus to persist [2]. Beijing’s development architecture — an evolution of the Belt and Road and new Global Development Initiatives — continues to bind many countries through infrastructure, loans and purchase commitments [8].
5. Strategic hedging and the “Trump effect”
Analysts identify a distinct “Trump effect”: U.S. unilateralism and unpredictability have prompted states to hedge by diversifying relations with China, and Beijing has exploited openings to rally domestic constituencies and expand partnerships with countries alienated by Washington [2] [8]. At the same time, China has actively sought dialogues and channels to manage bilateral risk — preparing for different U.S. scenarios while avoiding overt interference that could inflame political backlash [9].
6. Limits, countervailing trends and domestic politics
The deepening of ties is not uniform or unidirectional: large majorities in key U.S. allies (South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, parts of Europe) still view China negatively even as small improvements in sentiment appear [10]. Some states are simultaneously strengthening protections or industrial policies against Chinese competition (Brazil, India, Indonesia, EU), showing hedging can include containment tools as well as engagement [11]. Reporting also documents Beijing’s careful choreography — balancing economic incentives with strategic outreach — rather than a simple, single‑track “win” [9] [5].
7. Bottom line
The post‑Trump return era has accelerated a pragmatic realignment: countries closest to China or most exposed to its economic pull have deepened bilateral ties for trade, investment and strategic hedging, while others pursue mixed strategies of engagement, protection and alliance management; the result is a more transactional, multipolar environment in which Beijing gains openings but not unconditional loyalty [2] [8] [3].