Which countries have seen the highest rates of political killings since 2025?

1. Summary of the results

The assembled analyses present a fragmented but converging picture: some datasets and reports identify exceptionally high rates of political violence in specific locales since 2025, with one claim placing Palestine at notably high event and death rates (310.9 and 415.8 per 100,000 respectively) and other sources documenting a sharp uptick in politically motivated killings and attacks in 2025, particularly tied to rising left-wing extremist incidents in the United States ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Reporting on the assassination of a high-profile figure is used as an exemplar of this broader trend and a possible catalyst for escalation, with commentators warning of a “vicious spiral” of retaliatory violence ^[4]. Separate datasets on general homicide and regional gang violence are noted but do not directly map onto politically targeted killings ^{[5] [6]}. The available materials therefore identify both country-specific hotspots and ideological patterns within 2025, but do so with differing measures and emphases.

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

Key omissions limit direct comparability across the analyses: definitions and measurement units vary — one source measures “events per 100,000 residents” and “deaths per 100,000 residents” as political-violence indicators, while others catalog incidents or plots without population-normalized rates, and still others report general homicide or gang violence that may not be politically motivated ^{[1] [7] [5]}. Temporal framing differs too: several pieces emphasize 2025 as an inflection year for left-wing incidents in the U.S., but lack baseline multi-year trend data or international comparators to show whether those rises surpass secular trends elsewhere ^{[2] [3] [8]}. Additionally, case-based reporting on high-profile assassinations can skew perceptions of broader patterns if not contextualized against systematic datasets; the linkage between partisan rhetoric, economic insecurity, and violence is presented as hypothesis-driven expert commentary rather than uniformly quantified causation ^{[4] [7]}.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

Framing which countries “have seen the highest rates” since 2025 risks misleading readers if sources conflate different metrics or rely on single-country extreme values; highlighting a singular high rate (e.g., Palestine’s figures) without methodological transparency can inflate perceptions that those rates are directly comparable to incident counts or homicide statistics presented elsewhere ^{[1] [5]}. Political actors or media outlets may benefit from emphasizing ideological narratives — for instance, framing 2025 as dominated by left-wing terror in the U.S. can serve agendas that either magnify threats for partisan mobilization or downplay other forms of political violence; the same applies to using high-profile assassinations to argue for imminent nationwide spirals without broader evidence ^{[2] [4] [3]}. Finally, mixing gang-related massacres or general homicide rates with politically motivated killings can obscure who's responsible and why, advantaging narratives that seek to attribute violence to particular groups or states without robust cross-source validation ^{[6] [5]}.