Which countries have not normalized relations with Israel despite the Abraham Accords?
Executive summary
The Abraham Accords formalized diplomatic ties between Israel and four Arab states—United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan (though Sudan’s deal remained troubled)—but many regional states have not normalized with Israel; prominent holdouts include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait, each for distinct strategic or political reasons [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. Public opposition and the Gaza wars have further chilled expansion of the Accords and complicated relationships even where formal ties exist [2] [7] [8].
1. Who explicitly has not normalized: the regional holdouts
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait figure repeatedly in contemporary reporting as countries that have not moved to normalize relations with Israel: Saudi talks have been suspended and Riyadh conditions normalization on progress toward a Palestinian state [6] [9], Iran is described as perhaps the least likely to normalize given its long-standing opposition and support for anti-Israel proxies [3] [10], Syria has publicly ruled out ties even as Israeli officials have floated security arrangements [3] [7], Lebanon’s leaders reject normalization while tensions and Israeli strikes persist along the border [4], Iraq remains outside the normalization circle and is often listed among states opposed to U.S.-led regional pressure, and Kuwaiti opinion polls show very high rejection of relations with Israel [10] [5].
2. Saudi Arabia: the prize that remains conditional
Saudi normalization is the single most discussed “next” possibility but has been repeatedly put on hold; Riyadh publicly ties any diplomatic opening to concrete steps toward a two‑state outcome or Palestinian sovereignty and suspended talks during rounds of Israeli‑Palestinian violence, making any near‑term deal unlikely despite U.S. and Israeli interest [11] [9] [6]. Analysts caution that even if a deal is struck it may fall short of transforming regional dynamics, since Gulf‑Israeli ties to date resemble “cold peace” and remain highly contingent on U.S. incentives and security calculations [12] [13].
3. Syria and Lebanon: security, occupation and domestic politics
Syria’s leadership has formally ruled out ties with Israel amid ongoing questions about the Golan Heights and domestic politics, while Lebanese officials and public opinion reject normalization as long as Israeli forces operate near Lebanon and conflict with Hezbollah persists [3] [4]. Reports note Israeli occupation of or strikes in contested areas as explicit barriers to any rapprochement with Damascus or Beirut, and both countries figure in scholarship as part of a block that resists the Accords’ logic [4] [7].
4. Iran and Iraq: ideological opposition and regional alignments
Iran remains the archetypal non‑participant: it sponsors Hamas and Hezbollah and rhetorically opposes Israel’s existence, making normalization virtually unimaginable under current leadership [3] [10]. Iraq, frequently grouped with Iran and Syria in analyses of states unreceptive to normalization, has internal political constraints and public hostility that prevent overt diplomatic moves toward Israel [10].
5. Gulf and Arab publics, and the special cases of Jordan and Egypt
Even where formal relations exist—most notably Egypt and Jordan—public opposition to deeper normalization or people‑to‑people engagement remains very high, and statespace and public opinion constrain how far governments will go to broaden ties; polling shows large majorities in Egypt and Jordan oppose business or sports ties with Israelis despite treaties [5] [8]. Sudan’s 2020 agreement is frequently noted as incomplete or fragile because domestic turmoil delayed implementation, underscoring that “signed” accords do not always equate to durable normalization [1] [2].
6. Why these non‑normalizations matter and the limits of the record
The pattern of non‑normalization shows a mix of principled stances, security concerns, domestic politics, and strategic hedging: Saudi caution, Iranian hostility, Syrian and Lebanese security disputes, Iraqi and Kuwaiti public resistance, and the fragile implementation in Sudan all explain why the Accords did not sweep the region [13] [5] [1] [4]. Sources vary on prospects: some see eventual Saudi breakthroughs and incremental expansion, others stress that popular opposition and the Palestinian question will continue to limit enlargement of the Accords without a credible Palestinian settlement [11] [12] [7]. Where the reporting is silent—on, for example, the final status of less‑mentioned governments—this account does not speculate beyond the cited sources.