Which countries joined the Abraham Accords after the original signatories and when did they sign?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Kazakhstan formally announced it would accede to the Abraham Accords on November 6–7, 2025; prior to that the original 2020 signatories were the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (September 15, 2020), with Morocco and Sudan joining later in 2020–21 [1] [2] [3]. Reporting and think‑tank accounts since 2024–25 show U.S. efforts to expand the Accords to states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Azerbaijan, but those countries had not completed accession as of the cited sources [4] [5] [6].
1. What “joined” and when — the documented additions
Kazakhstan is the clearest post‑2020 accession recorded in the available reporting: multiple sources state Kazakhstan announced formal accession on or around November 6–7, 2025 [1] [4] [5]. The original White House ceremony in 2020 involved the UAE and Bahrain (September 15, 2020), followed later in 2020 by Morocco’s normalization steps and Sudan’s signing of the general declaration (December 2020 and January 2021 respectively), though Sudan’s bilateral normalization remained conditional and in limbo [2] [3] [1].
2. Why Kazakhstan is different — symbolism more than a break with the past
Analysts and policy briefers describe Kazakhstan’s accession as largely symbolic because Astana already maintained diplomatic ties and bilateral agreements with Israel for decades; the move was framed as a political endorsement of the Abraham Accords framework rather than a novel breakthrough in regional Arab‑Israeli normalization [1] [5]. Sources explicitly characterise the November 2025 step as “largely symbolic” given existing relations [1].
3. The push to expand — U.S. diplomacy and its limits
Since early 2025, U.S. policymakers and the second Trump administration actively promoted enlargement of the Accords to include Central Asian and other states; envoys traveled to Baku and the broader region to court Azerbaijan and post‑Soviet governments, and the administration publicly floated Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon as potential candidates [5] [4] [6]. Think‑tank and media reporting stresses that expansion efforts were politically driven by Washington’s strategic aims — economic integration and a regional security architecture — but were constrained by the changing context on the ground, notably the Gaza war and its political fallout [6] [5] [7].
4. Who is actively discussed but not formally in the Accords
Multiple reputable sources report serious interest or U.S. outreach toward Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Azerbaijan, but they do not record completed accession as of the cited pieces; Saudi talks were particularly prominent in U.S. diplomacy but reportedly stalled after regional crises, and Syria and Lebanon were named as potential future entrants contingent on political shifts [4] [6] [7] [8]. The sources therefore distinguish between active diplomatic efforts and formal joining — the latter is only documented for Kazakhstan in November 2025 among post‑2020 states [1] [4].
5. Political context that explains limited enlargement
Analyses underline that the Accords’ expansion is tethered to wider regional developments: the Gaza conflict, Israeli military actions, Palestinian‑Israeli politics and domestic instability in candidate countries all raised the political cost of joining for Arab publics and governments [6] [7] [9]. Several sources argue that without credible progress on the Palestinian question, many Arab capitals would be reluctant to formalize ties despite U.S. and Israeli incentives [6] [9].
6. Sources, competing perspectives and limitations
The narrative above synthesizes news outlets and policy centers: encyclopedic summaries (Britannica) list the timeline of early signatories and mention Kazakhstan’s November 2025 accession [2] [3], think tanks and institutes (Carnegie, MEI, Atlantic Council, Washington Institute) provide context on U.S. expansion efforts and political obstacles [6] [5] [10] [9], and reporting pieces summarize diplomatic maneuvers (Reuters, DW) and describe stalled or conditional talks with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon [11] [7]. These sources sometimes frame the same facts differently — e.g., whether expansion is primarily strategic, economic, or symbolic — and readers should note institutional perspectives (U.S. policy briefs versus independent media) that might shape emphasis [5] [6].
Available sources do not mention any other countries having formally joined the Abraham Accords after 2020 besides Kazakhstan, nor do they provide a signed date for Morocco or Sudan beyond the 2020–21 period beyond what is cited above [2] [3] [1].