What were the main criticisms of the Nobel Committee's decision to award Barack Obama the Peace Prize in 2009?
Executive summary
The Nobel Committee’s choice of Barack Obama for the 2009 Peace Prize drew two dominant lines of criticism: that the award was premature—rewarding rhetoric and promise rather than concrete achievements—and that the decision reflected politicized, reputation-driven instincts within the committee that damaged the Prize’s credibility. Those arguments were amplified by high-profile commentators, partisan reaction in the United States, and later admissions from inside the Nobel apparatus that the prize had not produced the strengthening-of-peace effect the committee hoped for [1] [2] [3].
1. The “too early” critique: honoring potential, not results
A central and persistent objection was that Obama had been president for less than a year and had no substantive peace-making track record to merit the Prize, which traditionally rewards concrete achievements or long campaigns against oppression; critics argued the committee effectively awarded “hope” and international symbolism rather than verified accomplishments [1] [2]. Commentators and editorial writers insisted the Nobel should recognize deeds—saving lives, ending conflicts, or enduring personal sacrifice—whereas Obama’s portfolio at the time consisted mainly of diplomatic overtures and campaign promises, a gap many said made the prize feel premature [2] [4].
2. Charges of politicization and institutional agenda
Several critics framed the choice as evidence the Nobel Committee had moved from honoring tangible peace work to making political statements; Peter Wehner argued the Committee “long ago ceased to be a serious entity,” while others saw the award as part of a pattern of symbolic rebukes or endorsements of U.S. administrations [5]. That critique implied an implicit agenda: rewarding a popular political figure whose rhetoric fit a particular post‑Bush international narrative, rather than recognizing a discrete peace achievement [6] [5].
3. High-profile ridicule and partisan backlash
The prize produced sharp partisan responses that underscored the controversy: conservative pundits and politicians called the decision a farce or worse, with Rush Limbaugh saying the committee had “suicide‑bombed” its credibility and critics labeling Obama an “international superstar with no accomplishments” [2] [5]. Voices across the spectrum—John Bolton called the award “pedestrian, turgid, and uninspired,” and Dennis Kucinich protested the conceptual slipperiness of awarding peace while continuing wars—illustrated that the backlash was both ideological and substantive [5].
4. Expectations versus outcomes: the committee’s own regret
The Nobel Committee’s later insiders voiced regret that the prize had not achieved the intended strengthening effect; Geir Lundestad, the ex‑secretary of the Nobel Institute, wrote that the award “failed to achieve what the committee hoped it would,” reflecting an internal reassessment that the gamble on early encouragement did not pay off as anticipated [3]. That admission bolstered critics’ claims that the Committee had misread either the president’s immediate capacity to reform policy or the Prize’s power to reshape geopolitical realities [3].
5. Nuanced defenses and the limits of the criticism
Defenders pointed to the Committee’s stated motivation—“for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples”—and framed the award as recognition of a shift in tone and approach after the Bush years, not a blank check for future success [1]. Scholars and commentators also noted the political risk the Committee took in hoping to encourage diplomacy; some argued that expectation, while debatable, was a defensible interpretive expansion of the Prize’s remit even if it invited controversy [6].
6. The legacy: credibility costs and unavoidable ambiguities
In sum, the main criticisms coalesce around timing, substance, and institutional judgment: the Prize was seen as premature, potentially politicized, and ultimately ineffective at catalyzing the changes the Committee sought—conclusions reinforced by media ridicule and by Lundestad’s later reflections that the award did not deliver the hoped‑for strengthening of Obama’s diplomacy [2] [5] [3]. At the same time, the Committee’s official rationale and some scholarly defenses show this controversy sits at the intersection of normative questions about what the Peace Prize should reward and pragmatic doubts about whether a symbolic honor can alter state behavior [1] [6].