Did denmark expose mossad agents identity to iran
Executive summary
There is no evidence in the reporting provided that Denmark exposed the identities of Mossad agents to Iran; contemporary accounts from 2018 say the flow of information went the other way — Israeli intelligence (Mossad) supplied Denmark with tips that helped foil a suspected Iranian assassination plot on Danish soil — and Denmark publicly acted against Iran, including recalling its ambassador [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. What happened in Denmark in October 2018 — who told whom
Danish security services announced in late October 2018 that they had disrupted what they described as an Iranian intelligence operation to target members of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA) inside Denmark, and Danish authorities said their investigation was informed by intelligence provided by Israel’s Mossad, a claim reported by multiple outlets including the BBC, Ynet and The Times of Israel [1] [2] [3].
2. Official Danish response and Tehran’s denial
Following the arrests and public statements by PET (Denmark’s security service), Denmark escalated diplomatic pressure by recalling its ambassador to Tehran; Iran categorically denied responsibility and accused Mossad of planting false flags, a denial and diplomatic fallout documented in contemporaneous reporting [4] [1] [3].
3. The specific allegation under consideration — did Denmark “expose” Mossad agents to Iran?
None of the supplied sources make any factual claim that Denmark revealed Mossad operatives’ identities to Iran; on the contrary, the sources consistently describe Mossad as the provider of intelligence to Denmark [2] [5] [1]. Provided material does include examples of intelligence agencies publicly naming foreign operatives in other contexts — for example reporting that Mossad revealed the identity of an IRGC Quds Force commander in a separate case — but that is not the same as Denmark exposing Israeli agents to Tehran [6].
4. How journalists and governments framed responsibility and motive
Reporting emphasized a triangular dynamic: Denmark and its security services portraying Iran as the aggressor on Danish soil, Israel presented as a partner providing counterterrorism intelligence, and Iran depicted by its foreign ministry as the aggrieved party accusing Israel of deception; multiple outlets quoted Danish PET and Israeli sources while noting Tehran’s denials [1] [3] [4]. This framing suggests clear institutional incentives for Denmark and Israel to publicize Iranian culpability and for Iran to rebut those claims, but none of the supplied accounts supports an opposite claim that Denmark betrayed Israeli assets.
5. Broader context of espionage and later cases — why confusion can arise
Europe’s dealings with Iranian intelligence were later referenced in follow-up reporting about suspected Iranian operations in 2025 and beyond, including arrests of individuals accused of spying for Iran in Europe, which shows an ongoing pattern of Iranian intelligence activity on the continent but does not retroactively establish that Denmark exposed Mossad personnel in 2018 [7] [8]. Separately, public revelations by intelligence services about foreign agents or operatives (for instance Mossad exposing an IRGC commander) demonstrate that naming adversary operatives happens, but the supplied material does not connect such disclosures to Denmark revealing Israeli agents to Iran [6].
6. Bottom line and limits of this assessment
Based on the documents supplied here, the direct answer is: no — the reporting does not support the claim that Denmark exposed Mossad agents’ identities to Iran; instead the record shows Mossad providing intelligence to Danish authorities who then acted publicly against an alleged Iranian plot [2] [1] [3]. If there are other allegations or classified developments claiming a Danish hand in exposing Mossad operatives to Tehran, those are not present in the materials provided and cannot be confirmed or refuted on that basis.