Do iranians people statisticaly "enjoy" the attual goverment?

1. Widespread economic pain has translated into political discontent

The proximate cause of the most recent wave of anti-government mobilization is economic: the rial’s collapse, runaway inflation and food-price spikes have pushed living standards into crisis, prompting merchants’ strikes and protests in dozens of cities that quickly broadened into explicit anti-regime demonstrations ^{[3] [6] [7]}. International agencies and parliaments note food inflation above 70% and projections of continued economic contraction, facts that feed popular grievance and drive the statistical signals of dissatisfaction recorded in recent months ^[3].

2. Polls and expert readings show a majority reject the regime

Independent and academic polling cited in reporting finds strong anti-regime sentiment: a GAMAAN survey and related analyses reported that most Iranians reject the Islamic Republic, with 89% favoring democracy in one questionnaire and opposition strongest among young, educated and urban citizens ^[2]. Iranian academics quoted in regional outlets put public dissatisfaction as extremely high—one prominent Tehran professor is cited estimating 92% dissatisfaction with the current situation—figures consistent with the mass protests ^[1].

3. Support is not uniform—rural and demographic cleavages matter

Despite majority rejection in many datasets, support is uneven: rural areas and older cohorts show stronger backing for the system, with rural support for the current system reported at around 28% in one survey—nearly double the urban level—underscoring sizable minorities who either favor stability or distrust alternatives ^[2]. Reporting from the provinces also conveys mixed local effects—some businesses reported unusual upticks during unrest—which highlights that public sentiment is not monolithic ^[8].

4. The state’s coercive strength and elite cohesion complicate statistical forecasts

Even where majorities express anger, there is no clear empirical evidence of elite defection or a breakdown of security forces: analysts note the regime’s coercive apparatus remains intact and the IRGC and military have signaled a readiness to defend the system, meaning popular dissatisfaction has not yet translated into regime collapse ^{[4] [5]}. Commentators caution that repression, internet shutdowns and criminalization of protest activity limit both political expression and the accuracy of opinion measurement ^{[9] [5]}.

5. Competing narratives and source biases demand caution

Some of the strongest claims about regime illegitimacy come from opposition-aligned outlets and exile groups that have vested interests in portraying maximal rejection, and state media simultaneously advances narratives of foreign interference; both frames influence what is reported and how statistics are interpreted ^{[10] [11]}. Independent press investigations and international media converge on the same core facts—economic collapse, mass protests, and widespread dissatisfaction—but methodological caution is warranted given constrained survey environments ^{[4] [12]}.

6. Bottom line: the statistical picture points to broad dissatisfaction, not unanimous rejection

Taken together, contemporary surveys, on-the-ground reporting and expert commentary indicate that a majority of Iranians are dissatisfied with and oppose the current government’s performance and legitimacy, especially in urban and younger demographics, but meaningful pockets of support persist and the regime retains force and elite backing that prevent a straightforward statistical declaration of immediate collapse ^{[2] [1] [4]}. Reporting limitations—repression, sampling challenges and politicized sources—mean any precise percentage should be treated cautiously; still, the preponderance of evidence in these sources supports the conclusion that most Iranians do not “enjoy” the present government.