Do a majority of Russians support the war they are currently in?
Executive summary
Available polling indicates that a plurality-to-majority of Russians have expressed support for — or at least acceptance of — the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, but that support is uneven, contested by rising war-weariness and shaped by powerful information controls that make any definitive claim about private attitudes uncertain [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. What the headline polls say: a majority, on balance
Several reputable surveys and recent reports put expressed backing for the war in the neighborhood of a majority: joint polling from the Chicago Council and the Levada Center reported that the Russian public “remains largely supportive” of the special military operation [1], NORC found most Russians view the invasion as a justified defense against Western threats with large shares framing it as a civilizational struggle [5] [2], and the state-run VTsIOM reported 55% of respondents expect the war to end in 2026 — a signal of public acceptance of the conflict’s continuation until desired objectives are met [6] [7] [3].
2. But support is qualified: fatigue, hopes for negotiation, and mixed evaluations
Even within those majorities, attitudes are not uniform: many Russians say the operation has caused harm as well as benefit and a rising share favor peace talks, with independent Levada results showing about two‑thirds supporting negotiations — the highest since 2022 — and other polls registering significant concern about economic hardship and a desire to “return to normal” [1] [6] [8] [9]. Academic work describes a paradox of “optimism amid crisis,” where expressed belief that the war will end and priorities like veteran reintegration or reconstruction coexist with grievances about economic and social costs [10].
3. The information environment makes true levels of private dissent hard to gauge
Serious caveats accompany headline figures: multiple analysts and institutions warn that Russia’s tightly controlled media, censorship and legal restrictions on dissent distort public expression and the reliability of polls, meaning stated support may overstate genuine private consent or understate quiet opposition [3] [4] [10]. Levada itself has been labeled a “foreign agent,” complicating its work inside Russia even as outside researchers continue to use its data [3]. Harvard and other analysts specifically caution that early polls showing roughly 60% support should be treated with care because of propaganda and the chilling effect on candid responses [4].
4. Social identity and geopolitical framing sustain support
Where support exists, it is reinforced by narratives that portray the conflict as defensive against NATO and Western hostility; many polls find large shares of Russians perceive the war as a struggle with Western influence, a frame that correlates with willingness to endure sanctions and support state policy [2] [9]. Commentators on identity politics and national memory argue these narratives — including appeals to the Great Patriotic War — have consolidated a patriotic core that sustains acceptance of the conflict even as costs mount [11].
5. Bottom line and limits of available evidence
The best reading of the reporting is that a majority of Russians, by multiple measures, have publicly supported or accepted the war at various points, but that support is neither absolute nor static: it is fragmented by economic pain and desire for an end, amplified by state messaging, and blurred by methodological limits that make private dissent difficult to measure reliably [1] [6] [4] [10]. Any firm verdict must therefore acknowledge two realities shown in the sources: polling often records majority support or acceptance, and simultaneously scholars and journalists warn that authoritarian controls and social pressures mean those numbers cannot be treated as an unmediated reflection of private conviction [3] [4] [10].