Fact check: Which political ideology is more commonly associated with domestic terrorism in the US?

1. Why multiple analyses point to right‑wing violence as the major killer

Multiple studies and news analyses published in mid‑ to late‑September 2025 find that right‑wing extremists account for the most frequent and deadliest domestic terror attacks in recent U.S. history. The data referenced in these pieces identify a pattern of higher fatality counts and more frequent lethal plots traced to right‑wing actors, explicitly challenging political claims that equate or elevate left‑wing violence to the same scale as right‑wing threats ^{[4] [1]}. These reports emphasize that lethality—measured by fatalities and mass‑casualty events—shows a clear imbalance that shapes homeland security priorities and public debate, underscoring why agencies and researchers flagged the right wing as the predominant lethal threat in analyses published on September 17 and 20, 2025 ^{[1] [4]}.

2. Data nuance: numbers versus trends and emerging shifts

While multiple pieces agree on the historical predominance of right‑wing lethal attacks, some reporting from September 23 and later warns of emerging trends that complicate that picture: left‑wing attacks increased in frequency in recent years, and 2025 marked a notable uptick in left‑wing incidents by certain counts, though not in lethal outcomes ^[2]. This suggests two different metrics matter: frequency of incidents and deadliness of attacks. The sources show that even when left‑wing violence rises in incident count, right‑wing attacks have continued to produce most fatalities, a distinction that affects policy, resource allocation, and public perception ^{[2] [1]}.

3. How religion and rhetoric feed into the violence picture

Reporting on Christian nationalism and incendiary religious rhetoric in late September 2025 connects faith‑based extremism and partisan frames to domestic violence, showing how religious identity can motivate or legitimize attacks for some perpetrators. Articles highlight sermons and public commentary labeling political opponents in terms evocative of terrorism, which can normalize dehumanizing language and feed radicalization pathways ^{[3] [5]}. These pieces argue that religion‑oriented narratives are a significant driver for a subset of right‑leaning extremists, which helps explain why analyses focused on right‑wing lethality also discuss religious motivations and the blurred lines between political ideology and faith‑based extremism ^[3].

4. Media framing and political claims: contested narratives

Several analyses explicitly push back on public political claims that left‑wing violence equals or exceeds right‑wing threats, labeling such claims as contradicted by the empirical record through September 2025 ^{[4] [1]}. At the same time, commentary and local reporting underline how rhetoric from both sides can inflate perceptions of the opposite wing’s danger, making framing and political agendas central to how the public understands which ideology is “more commonly associated” with domestic terrorism. Journalists and researchers caution that selective use of incident counts or anecdotal events can mislead audiences, and encourage looking at multiple metrics—fatalities, arrests, plots, and ideology motivation—when assessing risk ^{[1] [6]}.

5. What researchers and reporters disagree about and why it matters

Disagreements among the September 2025 pieces revolve not over whether right‑wing lethality has been dominant, but over how to interpret rising left‑wing incidents, the role of local versus national data, and the influence of religious rhetoric. Some sources emphasize that increased left‑wing activity in 2025 signals a shift needing attention, while others maintain that fatality patterns still justify prioritizing right‑wing threats ^{[2] [1]}. These differences matter for policymakers because resource allocation, law enforcement priorities, and legislative responses depend on whether agencies treat the trend as a broadening of the threat landscape or a continued concentration of lethality within a single ideological cluster ^{[4] [2]}.

6. The limits of the available analyses and cautionary notes

All cited analyses are subject to limitations inherent to collecting and coding politically motivated violence: definitions of “terrorism,” ideological classification, and time windows affect conclusions. The September 2025 pieces rely on differing datasets and methodologies, and commentators note that online radicalization, clandestine plotting, and underreporting can skew counts. Given these constraints, the body of reporting nonetheless converges on the practical takeaway that right‑wing actors caused the majority of fatalities up to those publication dates, while also signaling an uptick in other forms of politically motivated violence that merits monitoring ^{[4] [1] [2]}.

7. Bottom line for readers and policymakers

The consolidated reporting from September 17–28, 2025 supports a clear empirical statement: right‑wing political ideology has been more commonly associated with deadly domestic terrorism in the U.S., but the landscape is changing, with rising left‑wing incidents and faith‑driven rhetoric complicating the threat picture. Stakeholders should therefore maintain a dual focus: continue addressing the historically deadliest threats while expanding surveillance, prevention, and community resilience measures to respond to evolving forms of politically motivated violence ^{[1] [3] [2]}.