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How have extended presidential terms in other democracies affected legislative and judicial independence?
Executive summary
Extended or abolished presidential terms have often coincided with weakened legislative and judicial independence in many countries — incumbents use constitutional changes, reinterpretations, or maneuvers to stay in office, and scholarship links those moves to consolidation of executive power and erosion of checks [1] [2]. At the same time, some researchers argue that term limits are not a universal necessity and that effects vary by historical and institutional context: adherence and enforcement matter as much as the written term length [3] [4].
1. Why longer terms or no limits tend to matter: personalization and concentration of power
Political scientists and commentators warn that removing or extending limits concentrates power in one person and can personalize politics, making cronyism and erosion of institutions more likely; analyses of recent examples (Venezuela, Russia, China, and African cases) present this pattern as a common pathway from formal change to de facto executive dominance [5] [2] [1]. Authors note that when incumbents win legal reforms or reinterpretations to extend tenure, the change is often part of a broader strategy — using state resources, legal engineering, or referenda — that also undermines independent checks [3] [1].
2. Legislative independence under extended presidencies: from co‑option to gridlock
Sources show two competing dynamics after term extensions. In some systems executives co‑opt legislatures — using party control, appointments, or rewards to neutralize opposition — which reduces legislative autonomy and oversight of the executive [1] [4]. Conversely, in divided systems the fixed executive term can produce persistent gridlock if legislatures retain independence but cannot remove an unpopular president, revealing that a longer or extended term does not mechanically make legislatures subservient everywhere; institutional design and party balance shape outcomes [6] [7].
3. Judicial independence: legal façade and institutional erosion
Scholarship documents a pattern where legal routes (constitutional amendments, favorable court rulings, or reinterpretation of term clauses) are used to legitimize extensions, which simultaneously puts courts under pressure to validate executive initiatives — a process that can hollow out judicial independence even while appearing constitutional [1] [3]. Studies cited in the literature emphasize that technical compliance with constitutional procedures does not guarantee true adherence to constitutionalism: courts may become co‑opted or intimidated, undermining their role as an effective check [3] [4].
4. Variation by context: not inevitable, but highly contingent
Researchers caution that outcomes are not uniform. Some democracies maintain limits and healthy checks; others see repeated contraventions. The likelihood that extensions will weaken institutions depends on factors such as historical enforcement of constraints, strength of civil society, party structures, and international pressure — meaning longer terms can coincide with stronger or weaker legislatures and judiciaries depending on those conditions [4] [1]. Scholarship argues that adherence to term limits correlates with institutional trajectories and that past enforcement influences future compliance [4].
5. International and policy responses: aid, norms and deterrence
Analysts recommend external tools — democracy aid, conditionality, and normative pressure — to raise the cost of circumventing term limits; empirical work finds democracy assistance can influence the success rate of term‑extension attempts, implying international responses matter for preserving legislative and judicial independence [1]. Advocates for term limits likewise argue that limits are a key safeguard against “strongman” tendencies and that international and domestic actors should defend them [8] [2].
6. Competing arguments: term limits as constraint vs. voter sovereignty
Scholars present a debate: some treat limits as essential checks preventing tyranny and enabling institutional rotation; others argue limits restrict voter choice and that democratic legitimacy can, in theory, permit longer mandates if institutions remain robust [3] [5]. The literature therefore urges focus on enforcement and institutional health rather than treating term length as a sole determinant of democratic quality [3] [6].
7. What this means for comparative inference and policy
Available work shows a clear association between successful term‑extension efforts and subsequent pressures on legislative and judicial independence, but causation varies with local history, enforcement, and international dynamics [1] [4]. Policymakers should assess not only whether terms change but how they change — who drives the change, whether procedures are respected, and whether independent institutions retain capacity to check the executive [3] [2].
Limitations: available sources emphasize patterns and case studies and present competing normative views on term‑limits; they do not provide a single causal estimate applicable to every country, and further empirical study is cited as ongoing [3] [1].