How have El Salvador and the United States coordinated on handling migrants labeled as gang-affiliated since 2024?
Executive summary
Since 2024, coordination between the United States and El Salvador on migrants labeled as gang-affiliated has combined formal agreements, ad hoc operational deals and law-enforcement cooperation — from asylum frameworks to deportation flights and prison placements — while provoking legal challenges and human-rights alarms about vetting, transparency and due process [1] [2] [3]. The partnership advances mutual security and political goals but rests on contested evidence and opaque procedures that critics and some lawmakers say risk sending people with no criminal records into El Salvador’s punitive prison system [4] [5].
1. Policy tools and legal cover: asylum accords and extraordinary powers
The bilateral architecture includes an Asylum Cooperative Agreement the U.S. and El Salvador concluded implementation accords for in 2020, intended to let some migrants seek protection in El Salvador rather than the U.S. border system [1], while more recent U.S. administrations have invoked rare or extraordinary legal authorities — including the Alien Enemies Act — to justify expedited removals to El Salvador in 2025, a move that dramatically broadened the U.S. toolkit for designating and transferring alleged gang affiliates [3] [2].
2. Operational coordination: flights, payments and custody in a mega-prison
Operationally the two governments struck deals to transfer and house alleged gang members in El Salvador, including an arrangement in which the U.S. agreed to pay roughly $6 million for El Salvador to incarcerate hundreds of detainees in its high‑security Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), and multiple flights moved groups of migrants — including Venezuelans the U.S. labeled members of Tren de Aragua — into Salvadoran custody in 2025 [2] [3] [6].
3. Law-enforcement cooperation and targeted removals
U.S. agencies continue standard deportation cooperation with Salvadoran counterparts and task forces: ICE cited joint operations and thanked ICE El Salvador and the SAFE Task Force in public removals of Salvadoran gang leaders, reflecting ongoing enforcement-level partnerships to identify and return individuals deemed dangerous [7] [8].
4. Evidence, vetting and the credibility gap
Major outlets and advocates reported that a significant share of those flown to El Salvador lacked criminal records in accessible databases and that identification often relied on indicators such as tattoos — a method human-rights groups and journalists warned can be unreliable — with investigations finding that about 75% of a group of Venezuelans sent to CECOT had no apparent criminal records in the records 60 Minutes examined [4] [3] [9]. Government statements asserting gang membership have sometimes not been substantiated in court or with publicly disclosed evidence, prompting confusion and criticism [10] [9].
5. Legal, congressional and human-rights pushback
The transfers provoked court challenges, congressional requests for transparency and criticism from human-rights organizations over due process and conditions inside El Salvador’s mega-prison; Congress has sought more information about any bilateral removal agreements and U.S. funding tied to detaining alleged gang members abroad, while rights groups flagged mass arrests and reported abuses under President Bukele’s crackdown [5] [11] [3]. U.S. courts have required sufficient notice so detainees can contest removals, and lawyers argue those already transferred face limited avenues for review [10].
6. Political incentives, outsourcing and longer-term risks
The partnership advances U.S. goals of removing people labeled dangerous from U.S. custody and gives El Salvador a financial and political incentive to accept detainees and showcase tough-on‑crime credentials, but scholars caution deportation-driven exportation of criminal networks has historically had blowback — increasing violence and cross-border criminal ties — and the pattern of outsourcing incarceration raises questions about accountability and whether short-term removals will reduce transnational gang threats or simply shift harms [12] [13].
7. What remains opaque and what to watch next
Key uncertainties persist: public records do not fully account for how U.S. agencies vet alleged gang membership before transfer, how many returned detainees have criminal records, or the long-term legal status and conditions of people held in CECOT; reporters, lawyers and lawmakers continue to press for lists, vetting protocols and access that would clarify whether bilateral coordination is enforcing criminal justice or facilitating indefinite, extrajudicial detention [4] [9] [5].