What are the political and legal steps required to 'Europeanize' NATO command and shift SACEUR roles to non-U.S. officers?
Executive summary
A move to “Europeanize” NATO command and install a non‑U.S. SACEUR would be as much political as legal: it would require unanimous alliance agreement to rewrite long‑standing practice that ties the SACEUR post to a U.S. officer and to disentangle that post from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) dual‑hat, plus national political buy‑in inside Washington and across European capitals [1] [2] [3]. Proposals and debates already exist in policy circles, but the change would implicate alliance command arrangements, national force‑contribution politics, and U.S. strategic interests—creating both technical legal steps and high‑stakes diplomacy [4] [5] [6].
1. The starting point: what the rules and practice are today
NATO’s practice is that SACEUR is traditionally an American general who is dual‑hatted as Commander of USEUCOM, and the post answers to NATO’s Military Committee and North Atlantic Council for operations [1] [3] [2]. By contrast DSACEUR is always European and the Berlin Plus arrangements already permit SHAPE/DSACEUR to play EU operational roles under unanimous political conditions, showing an existing template for European operational command within NATO‑EU links [7].
2. Political prerequisites inside NATO: unanimity and bargaining
Any formal shift would require a political decision by the North Atlantic Council and the unanimity that governs major NATO posture changes; NATO’s command relationships and operational authorities are determined politically among allies and implemented by the Military Committee, meaning allies must agree a new appointment practice and chain of command [1] [8]. That political deal would hinge on persuading the United States to give up the customary claim to SACEUR or to accept a reconfigured dual‑hat where USEUCOM and ACO split—an outcome requiring intensive transatlantic bargaining and concessions on burden‑sharing [2] [6] [5].
3. Legal and bureaucratic steps inside NATO and member states
Legally, NATO does not have a single treaty clause naming the nationality of SACEUR in publicly cited sources; the practice rests on political arrangements and command agreements embedded in NATO’s internal documents and bilateral understandings, such as the 1993 SACEUR Agreement that governs national headquarters arrangements and deployable corps relationships [9]. Changing practice would therefore mean negotiating new NATO internal arrangements and amended command agreements, ratified or accepted by all member capitals through the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee processes [9] [1].
4. The U.S. domestic and force‑structure dimensions that must be addressed
Because SACEUR has historically been “double‑headed” with USEUCOM, a European SACEUR would require the United States to separate command of U.S. forces in Europe from alliance operational command or accept U.S. forces being commanded under a European officer—an outcome U.S. officials and some NATO partners regard as politically fraught and operationally sensitive [6] [3]. Washington’s willingness to renounce the post or to redesign the dual‑hat arrangement is therefore the decisive hinge; recent U.S. messaging about reducing senior U.S. posts while keeping SACEUR unchanged illustrates Washington’s leverage and reluctance [5] [6].
5. Practical implementation: steps, timelines and conditionalities
In practice the alliance would need a phased plan: (a) political mandate from the North Atlantic Council to study options, (b) agreement on a new appointment process and command‑of‑forces rules, (c) amendment or replacement of internal SACEUR/SHAPE/USEUCOM arrangements (including any 1993 SACEUR Agreement implications), and (d) legal and budgetary adjustments at national level to reassign U.S. forces and authorities—each step conditioned on unanimous approval and likely subject to protracted negotiation over responsibilities like nuclear command, contingency planning, and force contribution [9] [7] [1]. Policy advocates and think tanks argue for a European SACEUR to shift responsibility to European militaries, while U.S. and some alliance voices warn of strategic signals and operational complications [4] [6].
6. Politics, agendas and the likely trajectory
Arguments for Europeanizing SACEUR center on rebalancing burdens and signaling European responsibility; advocates propose a European SACEUR with a U.S. deputy handling nuclear and U.S. force issues [4]. Opponents—particularly officials concerned with U.S. global reach and influence—see relinquishment as a major signal of strategic retrenchment and point to the practical difficulties of disentangling U.S. command of its own forces [6] [10]. Recent reporting indicates Washington is willing to hand more conventional planning to Europe but still treats SACEUR as a core American interest, underscoring that any change will be more political bargaining than legal paperwork [5] [11].