What executive or administrative alternatives to family detention existed during the Obama years and how were they evaluated?
Executive summary
The Obama administration inherited and debated a range of non‑custodial tools — broadly called alternatives to detention (ATDs) including community‑based case management, monitoring technologies, legal orientation programs, and supervised release — and sporadically piloted them even as it substantially expanded family detention in 2014 as a deterrent strategy [1] [2]. Advocates and some internal reviewers pointed to low‑cost, high‑compliance evidence for ATDs, while the Administration balanced those findings against legal constraints (Flores), politics, and a stated enforcement goal of discouraging arrivals, producing a mixed record of implementation and contested evaluation [1] [3] [4].
1. The policy menu: what qualified as an “alternative” under Obama
Alternatives to detention in Obama‑era practice ranged from low‑intensity measures — parole, release on recognizance, periodic check‑ins and legal orientation sessions — to higher‑touch “full‑service” case management programs that paired monitoring with wraparound social, legal and logistical support, and to electronic or GPS ankle monitors and other surveillance tools used to assure court appearance [1] [5] [6]. NGOs and researchers consistently framed ATDs as intended to replace expensive institutional beds where possible, not to become punitive substitutes for humane care [1].
2. Evidence and numbers: what advocates and agency data said
Advocacy reports and ICE/ DHS fiscal estimates touted ATDs as far cheaper and highly effective: the administration’s FY2016 material valued detention at roughly $343 per family per day versus an estimated ATD cost of about $5.16 per participant per day, while program data and pilot studies cited appearance rates above 95 percent for “full‑service” ATDs [1]. Human Rights First and other groups emphasized that legal orientation and counsel dramatically improve compliance — with representation associated with 98 percent appearance rates in some programmatic analyses — strengthening the empirical case for community‑based approaches [5].
3. Political calculus and the deterrence argument
Despite promising ATD metrics, the Obama White House and DHS repeatedly defended expanded family detention as a deterrent to the 2014 surge of families from the Northern Triangle, treating “recent arrivals” as an enforcement priority and stressing border control amid a politicized crisis narrative [2] [7]. Civil liberties groups disputed the deterrence claim and challenged family detention in court, arguing that there was no evidence incarceration dissuaded asylum‑seeking families and that detention harmed due process and human rights [4].
4. Legal limits and court pressure shaping alternatives
Legal constraints, most prominently the Flores settlement's restrictions on length and conditions of child detention, and ensuing court rulings, limited how the administration could use family detention and pushed the government to consider alternatives and process reforms; litigation also forced internal reassessments about compliance with child welfare standards and release practices [3] [8]. Courts and litigants repeatedly reminded DHS that tools existed to process families without blanket detention and that ATDs should be used when flight risk was manageable [8].
5. Implementation: pilots, contracts, and controversies
Implementation was uneven: DHS and ICE ran pilots and announced case‑management initiatives, but some procurements — notably an award to a private prison company to run a family case‑management initiative — drew sharp criticism from legal and religious organizations for choosing a corrections contractor over community service providers, raising questions about intent and effectiveness [9]. Independent analysts and internal reviewers documented periodic attempts to reform detention practice but recorded political and bureaucratic resistance that limited scale‑up of non‑custodial programs [10].
6. How evaluations were read and the lasting judgment
Evaluations were bifurcated: proponents and service‑oriented pilots pointed to low cost and high appearance rates as proof ATDs were viable alternatives, while enforcement officials and political leaders emphasized deterrence and border management, citing the 2014 surge to justify detention expansion; courts and human rights groups countered that legal obligations and humane treatment required minimizing detention and maximizing community‑based options [1] [4] [5]. Reporting and scholarship from the period document a mixed legacy — concrete ATD evidence existed and was persuasive to advocates and some officials, but political choices, legal battles, and contested narratives about deterrence kept family detention on the table throughout the Obama years [10] [7].