How have Georgia counties preserved and produced ballot images since the 2020 election?

1. The dust‑up: missing electronic images vs. preserved paper ballots

An audit of public records prompted by the watchdog VoterGA found that dozens of counties could not produce original ballot image files from November 2020, and VoterGA reported admissions from 56 counties that most or all such images had been destroyed, with a broader tally of 74 counties unable to produce all original images ^{[2] [3]}; at the same time state officials and neutral fact‑checks stressed that counties preserved the underlying paper ballots required by state and federal law and that multiple recounts and audits validated the statewide result ^{[1] [4]}.

2. How Georgia counties actually preserved ballots and images

Georgia’s routine practice has been to retain physical paper ballots—sealed and archived after canvass—and to create digital ballot images during scanning and tabulation; the state secretary of state maintains a Ballot Image Library where counties are expected to upload images after certification, though not all counties have completed uploads or retained original memory cards used in the scanners ^{[5] [2]}. Federal and state retention windows were frequently cited in reporting—federal guidance often referenced a 22‑month retention and Georgia’s law a 24‑month rule—which became central to disputes over whether deletion of images violated statute or merely reflected differing interpretations of retention duties ^{[3] [6]}.

3. Production: why some counties couldn’t produce original files

Counties used a mixture of workflows—compact flash cards for in‑person ballots, flash drives for mail ballots, manual uploads to county servers, or high‑speed scanner transfers—which meant the chain of custody for electronic files varied and in practice some counties overwrote or cleared memory cards either during routine IT maintenance or under guidance that some officials later said permitted erasure; VoterGA’s open records requests and press conference highlighted those admissions, while state officials and some counties said practices complied with how rules were interpreted at the time ^{[3] [2] [4]}.

4. Investigations, enforcement and political theater

The lack of images spawned lawsuits, demand letters, board reprimands and heightened scrutiny: the Georgia Election Board publicly reprimanded Fulton County and appointed an independent monitor for 2024 following findings about recount procedures and potential double‑counting, while federal agents executed a court‑authorized search seeking 2020 ballots, tabulator tapes and other records—moves that fed both legal disputes and political narratives about accountability and concealment ^{[7] [8]}. VoterGA has driven much of the litigation and public pressure, and reporting notes its activist mission to expose alleged integrity failures; state and national election experts counter that multiple hand counts and audits validated the outcome and that missing electronic images do not by themselves prove fraud ^{[9] [1] [10]}.

5. Practical implications for verification and future preservation

Practically, the preserved paper ballots meant post‑election verification could proceed through counts and audits even where original digital images were absent—Georgia officials repeatedly pointed to three separate tallies in 2020 and to retained ballots as the durable record—but the episode exposed weak spots in standardized preservation of digital artifacts, prompted calls for clearer retention rules and centralized guidance, and left a portion of the public skeptical because electronic images—convenient for independent review—were not uniformly available ^{[1] [4] [5]}. Reporting does not establish that destroyed images altered outcomes; it does establish uneven archival practices, active litigation and renewed pressure on counties and the state to tighten protocols for producing election records ^{[2] [7]}.