Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
Fact check: Can a state governor refuse to deploy National Guard troops to the US-Mexico border?
Executive Summary
State governors generally control their National Guard when the Guard remains under state authority (Title 32 or state active-duty), so a governor can refuse to deploy Guard troops to the U.S.–Mexico border in many circumstances; however, the President can federalize Guard units under specific statutory authorities (Title 10 and 10 U.S.C. § 12406) and thereby remove state control, a power that has been disputed in courts and politics [1] [2] [3]. Recent events show governors refusing deployments and litigation challenging federalization efforts, illustrating a contested and case-specific balance of power [4] [5].
1. Who actually commands the Guard — a constitutional tug-of-war that determines who decides
The practical answer turns on the Guard’s legal status: when in state status (under the governor via Title 32 or state law), the governor controls orders and can decline missions like border deployments; when federalized under Title 10, the President commands and state refusal becomes legally irrelevant. Federal law lays out conditions for federal activation and transfer of authority, most notably 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which frames when and how members can be called into federal service and routed through governors initially, creating legal friction over control [2].
2. Historical examples show governors have said no — and pulled troops back
Governors have in practice resisted or reversed deployments to the border. New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham publicly refused to assist mass deportations and ordered the withdrawal of most Guard personnel from the U.S.–Mexico border in 2019 and reiterated refusal in later actions, citing humanitarian and state-policy concerns; advocates and state officials, including the ACLU of Hawai‘i urging Governor Ige, provide additional examples of governors declining to send troops for federal immigration enforcement [1] [4] [6]. These episodes demonstrate state-level discretion when units remain under state control.
3. The Presidency’s statutory tools can override state refusal — but are contested
The President possesses statutory pathways to federalize the National Guard, which, if lawfully exercised, transfer command to the federal government and supersede a governor’s refusal. The Trump administration and subsequent efforts to use federalization or Title 10 authority to deploy forces to U.S. cities and potentially to state Guards have provoked legal challenges and political pushback, exemplifying a federal tool that can short-circuit state control but faces legal and constitutional challenge [5] [7] [3].
4. Courts are the battleground — states have sued to block federal takeovers
Governors and states have sued to prevent federal assumption of Guard control, arguing the statutory standards for federalization (such as invasion, rebellion, or inability to enforce federal law) were not met and that unilateral federalization exceeded executive authority. Oregon’s lawsuit against federal control and other litigation illustrates a credible legal pathway for governors to contest federal orders in court, turning operational decisions into adjudicated constitutional questions [3].
5. Political motives and messaging shape decisions — watch the agendas
Governors’ refusals often align with policy priorities — limiting family separations, opposing deportation drives, or resisting federal political theater — and federal pushes to deploy Guards likewise reflect executive priorities about border security or domestic unrest. Advocacy groups and political actors frame refusals and deployments to mobilize supporters; observers should treat statements from governors, the White House, and advocacy groups as political acts as well as operational decisions, revealing competing agendas behind legal claims [6] [1] [7].
6. Practical limits matter — logistics, mission type, and state law constrain action
Even absent federalization, governors weigh practicalities: funding (who pays under Title 32 vs. state active status), mission scope (humanitarian vs. law enforcement), and state statutes that limit using the Guard for deportations or domestic civil enforcement. Governors have declined missions they view as improper uses of the Guard or damaging to state economies and families, underscoring that legal authority interacts with operational and political constraints in real decisions [1] [4].
7. Recent timeline: evidence from 2019 through 2025 highlights evolving conflict
From New Mexico’s 2019 withdrawal to public refusals in 2024–2025 and litigation over federalization in 2025, the pattern is consistent: state refusals occur when the Guard remains state-controlled, and the federal government reacts with legal and policy maneuvers when it seeks to impose deployments. Coverage and official statements dated 2019 through October 4, 2025 show a cycle of refusal, attempted federalization, and court challenges, making each episode fact-specific and time-sensitive [4] [5] [3].
8. Bottom line for the original claim — conditional yes, but not absolute
A governor can refuse to deploy National Guard troops to the U.S.–Mexico border when those troops are under state control; however, the President can lawfully federalize Guard units under certain statutes and thereby deploy them despite a governor’s objection, a power that has been litigated and politically contested. Observers should assess the legal status of the Guard at issue, the statutory authority cited, and active litigation to determine who actually controls deployment in any specific episode [2] [3] [1].