What role do Greenlandic authorities and the Greenland Self‑Government play in basing decisions under the 1951 treaty and recent bilateral talks?
Executive summary
Greenlandic authorities occupy a complex, sometimes ambiguous role in decisions about foreign basing under the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement: legally, Denmark retained responsibility for defence and external relations under that treaty, but later practice and amendments have brought Greenland's Home Rule / Self‑Government into consultations and limited participation [1] [2]. Political reality is layered — Greenland controls most domestic powers and resources, can negotiate aspects of its future status, and has been treated as a stakeholder in recent bilateral talks even while ultimate treaty authority technically rests with the Kingdom of Denmark [3] [4].
1. The 1951 treaty’s legal baseline — Denmark’s lead on defence and external relations
The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement was signed explicitly between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark and frames Greenland’s defense arrangements within NATO, recognizing Danish sovereignty while authorizing U.S. and NATO defense activities and the establishment of “defense areas” where U.S. forces could operate with broad authorities [1] [4]. That treaty language and subsequent official summaries make clear that Denmark, not Greenland, was the formal contracting party for defence and external relations — the subjects the Self‑Government Act later carved out from Greenlandic autonomy [1] [3].
2. Greenlandic self‑government: extensive internal powers but reserved fields
Greenland’s Self‑Government Act devolved “virtually all” domestic powers to local authorities while explicitly reserving defence, monetary policy and external relations as exceptions, even though the Act also recognizes Greenland as a self‑determination unit that can change its status via referendum [3]. That statutory architecture produces a dual reality: Greenland runs most internal affairs and resources, yet the technical legal authority to conclude defense treaties historically remained with Denmark — a tension that colors contemporary basing debates [3].
3. Evolving practice: Home Rule / Self‑Government included in later agreements
Although the 1951 treaty was a Denmark–U.S. instrument, later practices and formal amendments have explicitly referenced Greenlandic institutions: a 2004 amending agreement and U.S. State Department notices describe arrangements “including the Home Rule Government of Greenland,” and official treaty texts address operational details like bases, flags and assistance for protection and internal security, indicating Greenland’s inclusion in implementation even if not as sovereign co‑signatory in 1951 [2] [5]. This shows institutional evolution toward consultation and practical involvement without upending the original sovereignty allocation.
4. How basing decisions work in practice: consultation, Danish primacy, Greenlandic leverage
Contemporary officials frame basing requests as matters Denmark would “examine” under the 1951 framework — a formulation that preserves Danish primacy while signaling that requests are not rubber‑stamped and will involve consultation with Greenlandic authorities and NATO partners [6]. Greenlandic leaders and ministers have at times pursued bilateral contacts or pushed for a greater say over resource and land matters, creating leverage in negotiations even as Denmark retains formal treaty power [4] [6].
5. Politics, narratives and hidden agendas in recent bilateral talks
Recent public disputes and media attention — including U.S. interest in increased presence and comments about “buying” Greenland — have amplified ambiguities in public perception: some U.S. commentators emphasize wide U.S. access under the 1951 pact, while Danish leaders stress the pact already provides security and warn against unilateral American initiatives [7] [8]. Greenlandic political actors have mixed incentives — asserting local control and resource rights while sometimes courting foreign partners — and Denmark has its own agenda to preserve sovereignty and NATO’s role, making negotiations as much about domestic politics and international signalling as about legal texts [3] [7].
6. Limits of the record and practical takeaway
The publicly available treaty texts and government statements show that Denmark legally controls defence and external relations under the 1951 agreement, but amendments and later practice brought Greenlandic institutions into the consultative and implementation loop; recent bilateral talks reflect that hybrid reality where Greenlandic authorities have meaningful political leverage even if formal treaty authority remains with the Kingdom of Denmark [1] [2] [3]. Reporting and official documents do not provide a step‑by‑step legal procedure for Greenland’s veto or consent in every basing scenario, so the balance between formal authority and political influence must be inferred from the evolving treaty practice and public statements [5] [6].