What legal processes would Greenland need to follow to become independent from Denmark?
Executive summary
Greenland’s legal path to independence is spelled out primarily in the 2009 Greenland Self-Government Act: a Greenlandic decision in favour of independence would trigger negotiations with Denmark, require endorsement by a Greenlandic referendum and consent by the Danish parliament, and culminate in a bilateral agreement that transfers sovereignty [1] [2]. Beyond that statutory route lie practical constitutional questions, complex negotiations over money, defence, citizenship and international recognition, and some scholarly debate about whether a Danish constitutional amendment would be necessary [3] [4] [5].
1. The statutory trigger: Section 21 of the Self‑Government Act
Greenland’s explicit legal mechanism for leaving the Kingdom is rooted in the 2009 Self‑Government Act, which recognizes Greenlanders as a people with a right to self‑determination and contains a provision (often cited as Section 21) that allows the Naalakkersuisut (Greenland’s government) to trigger an independence process and lays out that the people of Greenland may decide their status by referendum [2] [6].
2. The referendum and parliamentary consents that formalize the decision
If a majority in Greenland votes for independence, the Act requires negotiations between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut; any agreement on “introduction of independence” must have the consent of Inatsisartut (Greenland’s parliament) and be endorsed by a referendum in Greenland, and the completed deal must also receive the consent of the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) — because Denmark retains constitutional authority over changes to its territory [1] [3].
3. Danish constitutional and legal backstops: ceding territory under Article 19
Constitutional practice in Denmark provides an additional legal route: Article 19 of the Danish Constitution authorises the Danish government to cede part of its territory with parliamentary approval, and many legal authorities interpret that Greenland can become independent without a formal amendment of the Danish constitution so long as the Folketing approves the cession — though some scholars and commentators still raise the question whether a constitutional amendment would ultimately be needed [4] [5].
4. Negotiating the “divorce”: what must be agreed between Copenhagen and Nuuk
The required negotiations are not formalities: they would have to settle sovereignty transfer details including the timing, continuation or phasing‑out of Denmark’s annual block grant, the status of citizenship, legal systems and appeals, transfer of responsibilities such as policing and courts, and international obligations such as defence and treaty relations — all of which bear directly on viability and public support for independence [7] [3] [8].
5. International law, recognition and practical security arrangements
Under international law the process in the Self‑Government Act aligns with the right to self‑determination, but a new Greenlandic state would still need practical arrangements for defence, foreign relations and recognition; existing treaties — such as post‑war defence arrangements and the 1951 Greenland‑US/Denmark understanding — complicate but do not legally preclude independence, and major powers’ interests (notably the US) will shape negotiations over bases, defence guarantees and strategic arrangements [9] [10] [6].
6. Political economy and the non‑legal barriers that affect the legal process
Legal clearance alone is insufficient: public appetite in Greenland depends on economic realism because the Danish block grant is a large share of Greenland’s budget and would cease on independence unless otherwise negotiated; Greenland’s capacity to assume full sovereign responsibilities — from monetary policy to policing to international representation — is as decisive as the statutory referendum and parliamentary approvals [7] [6] [3].
Conclusion: a legal roadmap wrapped in political complexity
The law provides a clear roadmap: a Greenlandic referendum under the Self‑Government Act, negotiations and agreement between Nuuk and Copenhagen, and ratification by the Inatsisartut and the Folketing — possibly reinforced by constitutional steps depending on interpretation — but the trajectory will be governed as much by fiscal, defence and diplomatic bargaining as by statutory tick‑boxes [1] [4] [8].