How do Greenlandic political leaders and civil society view expanded NATO or U.S. military activity on the island?

1. Greenlandic leaders: sovereignty first, NATO framework second

Greenland’s elected officials have repeatedly said the island “cannot under any circumstances accept” being taken over by the United States and insist matters concerning Greenland must be decided by Greenland and Denmark together, framing their defence preferences squarely inside the Kingdom of Denmark and the NATO alliance rather than direct U.S. ownership ^{[1] [4] [5]}.

2. Denmark and Nuuk coordinating to head off U.S. unilateralism

Copenhagen and Greenland’s ministers met U.S. officials and agreed to create working groups to address American security concerns while defending Danish “red lines,” and Denmark has signaled it will boost and make more permanent its own military presence in and around Greenland—actions intended to demonstrate responsiveness to U.S. worries while protecting sovereignty ^{[6] [5] [2]}.

3. Preference for multinational NATO presence as a deterrent

European capitals and NATO officials have proposed sending multinational forces—aircraft, vessels and soldiers—to Greenland as a signal that the island’s defence is a collective Euro‑Atlantic priority; Danish and Greenlandic leaders have welcomed boosting defence “in the NATO framework,” reflecting a clear preference for allied burden‑sharing over bilateral U.S. control ^{[6] [7] [1]}.

4. Legal and practical constraints: the 1951 pact and U.S. access

Against political declarations sits a Cold‑War era reality: a 1951 defense agreement (updated later) already grants the United States broad rights to expand its military presence in Greenland, and analysts caution that Washington could increase forces under that treaty without buying the island—an uncomfortable legal lever that shapes Greenlandic and Danish calculations ^{[8] [5] [4]}.

5. Civil society and public sentiment: guarded, not fully documented

Open reporting notes Greenland’s small population and strategic value but provides little systematic polling of public opinion inside Greenland; leaders’ public statements—calling U.S. takeover ideas “fantasy” or “not for sale”—indicate political elites speak for popular resistance, yet the sources do not offer comprehensive evidence of civil‑society views beyond official pronouncements ^{[9] [1] [7]}.

6. Analysts and some local‑oriented voices favor stronger allied presence to protect sovereignty

Some analysts and commentators argue that an expanded NATO presence—rather than leaving the island defended by Denmark alone—would strengthen Greenland’s sovereignty by making any unilateral U.S. action politically costly and by deterring Russian or Chinese advances; this reasoning underpins pushes for a multinational deterrent and for Denmark to invite allies to take a visible role in the Arctic ^{[2] [3] [10]}.

7. Competing agendas and hidden political drivers

The debate mixes genuine Arctic security concerns—missile warning, surveillance, shipping routes—with political theater and great‑power signaling: U.S. executive rhetoric about “needing” Greenland can serve domestic political or symbolic ends, while European calls for multinational deployments seek both to reassure their publics and to blunt U.S. unilateralism, an interplay the sources identify as shaping policy more than grassroots consultation ^{[11] [10] [12]}.

8. Bottom line: conditional acceptance with firm red lines

The ensemble of Greenlandic and Danish statements plus allied proposals shows conditional acceptance of increased allied military activity—so long as it is multilateral, respects Greenlandic and Danish sovereignty, and occurs through NATO or collective arrangements; outright U.S. acquisition or coercive unilateral action is categorically rejected by Greenland’s political leaders, while civil society sentiment beyond official statements remains underreported in the available coverage ^{[1] [6] [2]}.