How has Greenlandic self-government influenced defense and foreign policy decisions since 1979?
Executive summary
Greenland’s move to self-government beginning with home rule in 1979 and deepened by the 2009 Self-Government Act has not transferred formal responsibility for defence and foreign policy from Copenhagen to Nuuk, but it has nudged those fields into a new, contested political space where Greenlandic actors increasingly shape agenda, rhetoric and practical cooperation with outside powers [1] [2]. That asymmetric empowerment has produced repeated tensions—over US bases, Arctic resources and who speaks for Greenland internationally—that expose competing agendas among Greenlandic aspirations, Danish constitutional limits, and great-power strategic interest [3] [4] [5].
1. A legal firewall that didn’t stop political practice
The Danish constitution and the Self-Government framework reserve foreign, defence and security policy to the central authorities in Copenhagen, a clear legal constraint reiterated by the Prime Minister’s Office and other official summaries of the realm’s competencies [1]. Yet from the outset Nuuk began exercising influence in international affairs in practice: the post-1979 evolution saw Greenlandic authorities participate in negotiations related to transferred matters and, crucially, the 2005 Authorisation Act codified Greenland’s ability to negotiate agreements in areas under its competence—an incremental shift that the academic literature treats as practice overtaking formal law [6].
2. From marginal voice to active international actor
Greenland’s government has not only demanded representation: it has built an external profile, issuing declarations (e.g., Itilleq 2003) and seeking a seat at Arctic tables; that activism culminated in a 2024 Greenland foreign, defence and security strategy that amplified Nuuk’s demand to be “heard” in matters affecting it [6] [7]. Denmark has responded by institutionalizing cooperation—creating a Danish-Faroese-Greenlandic contact committee in 2021 and giving Greenland an enhanced role in delegations to the Arctic Council and Nordic institutions—acknowledging Nuuk’s practical stake even while retaining formal authority [1] [2].
3. Strategic location makes local politics global
Greenland’s geostrategic value—home to the U.S. Pituffik/Thule facility and a Cold War-era platform for Atlantic and missile-warning capabilities—means foreign capitals treat Greenlandic administration and rhetoric as material to their security calculations, not just legal footnotes [5] [2]. Episodes such as high-profile U.S. statements about “acquiring” Greenland underscore how Nuuk’s assertiveness can unsettle alliances and prompt Denmark and partners to augment Arctic defense postures, even as Denmark remains legally responsible for defence [3] [4].
4. Resources, independence ambitions and the foreign policy lever
The promise of mineral and hydrocarbon wealth under melting ice has turned economic self-sufficiency—and the route to potential independence—into a foreign-policy tool for Greenlandic politicians who leverage investment and bilateral contacts to advance autonomy goals, a dynamic scholars highlight as a driver of Nuuk’s growing external engagement [7] [6]. That economic agenda invites competing foreign interests and complicates Denmark’s monopoly on international representation, producing both cooperation (shared Arctic strategies) and conflict (public disputes with the U.S.) [2] [4].
5. Two narratives, two risks: de jure Danish control vs de facto influence
Analysts offer opposing readings: one stresses legal continuity—defence and foreign affairs are Danish responsibilities and remain so under self-government [1] [2]—while another views Greenland’s increased external activity as a creeping reconfiguration of who actually shapes policy on the ground, especially where Danish capacity or political will appears limited [6] [5]. Both narratives matter: the first protects alliance and treaty obligations; the second empowers Greenlandic agency but risks friction with allies when external powers exploit fissures [3] [8].
6. What the sources do not settle
The reporting and academic sources document practices, legal texts and episodes of diplomatic strain, but they do not provide a definitive catalogue of every decision where Greenland’s self-government changed outcomes in defence or diplomacy; detailed case-by-case causal tracing of Nuuk’s influence over specific Danish policy choices is limited in the available material [6] [1]. Where evidence is thin, the cautious conclusion is that Greenlandic self-government has been a force multiplier for visibility and negotiation leverage, not a legal transfer of sovereign control [1] [2].