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Any reported issues or controversies with Hart InterCivic machines in 2024?
Executive summary
Reports in 2024 about Hart InterCivic equipment focused on ballot-scanning failures in specific counties and local disputes over software updates — not a nationwide pattern of machines “flipping” votes; for example, Shasta County reported ink overspray that prevented some Hart scanners from reading ballots [1], and Montgomery County commissioners rejected a Hart software update amid local security concerns [2]. News coverage and manufacturer statements from the year describe isolated operational problems and public confusion, while manufacturer and certification documents assert accuracy or note fixes and intended functionality [3] [4] [5].
1. Local ballot-scanning problems: mechanical or print quality, not vote-switching
In October 2024, Shasta County election officials said ink overspray on some ballots prevented Hart InterCivic scanners from reading and tabulating those ballots; officials worked with Hart and the ballot printer to duplicate unreadable ballots so all votes would be counted [1]. Verified Voting’s equipment page also shows Hart’s Verity/scan systems in use and details typical tabulation behavior, indicating scanning hardware and paper quality are common axes of operational issues separate from vote-recording logic [6].
2. Manufacturer and local officials pushed back on “vote flipping” claims
When voters or local media raised claims that Hart machines had “flipped” or changed votes, Hart InterCivic and county officials publicly disputed those interpretations. A Fort Worth Star-Telegram Reality Check cited Hart saying its devices “are incapable of changing voters’ ballots” and that it was aware of an “isolated claim” in Tarrant County [3]. Historical context shows similar back-and-forth over eSlate behavior in prior years, with manufacturers and secretaries of state at times attributing issues to user error or misinterpretation rather than device malfunction [7] [8].
3. Software updates and local policy decisions stirred controversy
Montgomery County commissioners in Texas voted in 2024 to reject an update to Hart equipment and software ahead of a November election amid public comments and questions about the software’s security; county officials referenced an ongoing legal dispute involving Hart and the Texas Attorney General as part of the uncertainty [2]. That episode illustrates how administrative choices and litigation context can amplify local concern even where technical evidence of systemic failure is not presented [2].
4. Certification, testing, and vendor communications: assurances and known defects
State system test reports and certification materials show examiners sometimes find no tabulation accuracy problems while identifying discrete defects. For example, a Texas system examination noted no issues in accuracy or interpretation during mock elections but flagged readability problems with certain printers that Hart acknowledged as known and addressed through field service replacements [4]. Separately, an EAC discrepancy report from Hart’s Verity Voting 2.7 described specific behavior the vendor termed “intended functionality” and recorded that Hart submitted a new source code and trusted build to address issues [5].
5. Broader historical concerns and competing narratives
Independent reviews going back to the mid-2000s — including Project EVEREST and university penetration tests — documented vulnerabilities and raised questions about Hart systems historically, which continues to shape how new incidents are perceived [9]. At the same time, Hart and some state examiners have repeatedly defended the systems’ accuracy and security, creating two competing narratives: long-standing academic/technical scrutiny versus vendor and some election-official assurances [9] [4].
6. What reporting does not say (limits of current coverage)
Available sources do not mention a single nationwide technical failure in 2024 where Hart machines systematically altered vote totals; instead coverage centers on isolated county-level operational problems, administrative pushback on updates, and ongoing legal or historical disputes [1] [2] [3]. Available sources do not provide forensic findings from independent cybersecurity teams in 2024 that demonstrate deliberate tampering of vote records on Hart systems (not found in current reporting).
7. How to interpret risk going forward
The 2024 coverage suggests operational risks (ballot print quality, scanner feed issues, small device defects) and governance risks (decision-making on updates, litigation and public distrust) are the main flashpoints rather than confirmed systemic vote-flipping. Observers should weigh vendor statements and state exam reports (which often find no tabulation errors in tests) against independent historical vulnerabilities identified by academic reviews when assessing trust in Hart systems [4] [9] [3].
If you want, I can compile the 2024 articles and official reports mentioned here into a timeline or extract the exact language Hart and local officials used in their public statements.