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Has the 25th Amendment ever been used to remove or temporarily replace a president?
Executive summary
The 25th Amendment has clarified presidential succession since 1967 and has been used several times to transfer power temporarily (Section 3) but Section 4 — the provision that would allow the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet to declare a president unable to serve and trigger a potential congressional decision — has never been used to remove a sitting president [1] [2]. Section 1 (vice president becomes president on death, resignation, or removal) has operated in practice when vice presidents have succeeded presidents, and Sections 2 and 3 have been used to fill vice‑presidential vacancies and temporarily transfer power for medical procedures [3] [4] [5].
1. What the Amendment actually says — a short primer
The 25th Amendment confirms that if a president dies, resigns, or is removed after impeachment, the vice president becomes president (Section 1); it provides a mechanism to fill a vacant vice presidency (Section 2); it lets a president temporarily transfer power to the vice president (Section 3); and Section 4 lets the vice president and a majority of certain executive‑branch officers declare the president unable to discharge duties, making the vice president Acting President unless Congress rejects that determination by two‑thirds of both houses [2] [5] [3].
2. What has actually happened — the amendment in action
Sections 1 and 2 have been invoked in practice when vice presidents succeeded presidents (the constitutional principle Section 1 codified had earlier precedents), and Congress’s work on succession and filling vacancies followed ratification — for example, vice presidential replacements have been filled under Section 2 procedures when needed [3] [6]. Section 3 — voluntary, temporary transfers of power — has been used a handful of times when presidents underwent medical procedures and temporarily handed authority to their vice presidents [4] [1]. By contrast, Section 4, the involuntary disability/removal route, has never been invoked to make a president subject to removal via that mechanism [1] [7].
3. Why Section 4 has never been used — legal and political obstacles
Legal experts and institutional actors note that Section 4 is both procedurally complex and politically fraught: it requires the vice president plus a majority of Cabinet (or another body Congress might designate) to transmit a written declaration, and then — if the president disputes it — a 21‑day window during which Congress must act to sustain the vice president as Acting President by two‑thirds votes in both houses [2] [8]. Observers emphasize the high bar and overtly political consequences; some scholars point out the “political” nature of any attempt to use Section 4 as an alternative to impeachment [8].
4. Notable moments when Section 4 was discussed but not used
There have been episodes when Cabinet members, advisers, or lawmakers discussed invoking the 25th Amendment as a remedy for concerns about a president’s fitness; those discussions are reported in modern presidencies, but none culminated in the formal Section 4 process being started [9] [10]. Reporting and analysis repeatedly stress that Section 4 remains an untested, constitutionally available but practically daunting tool [10] [1].
5. Competing viewpoints on whether Section 4 should be used
Some constitutional scholars and commentators argue Section 4 is an essential safety valve for situations in which a president is incapacitated or "manifestly unsuited" to hold office and that Congress could and should consider clearer implementing laws [11]. Others warn Section 4 could be abused as a political weapon and that impeachment — a separate constitutional process — remains the primary removal tool for criminal or political misconduct [8] [5]. The debate features tensions between concerns about democratic accountability and the need for continuity and stability in executive power [8] [1].
6. What to watch going forward — practical implications
Because Section 3 has precedent for temporary medical transfers and Sections 1–2 have clear precedents, the enduring question is whether political actors will ever initiate Section 4 given its multi‑actor requirements and Congress’s two‑thirds standard. Reform advocates urge Congress to clarify procedures and membership of any Cabinet‑equivalent body; skeptics say doing so risks politicizing a tool meant to address genuine incapacity [3] [11] [8].
Limitations: available sources document usage of Sections 1–3 and the fact Section 4 has never been used, and they report public discussions about invoking it; available sources do not provide an exhaustive list of every historical Cabinet conversation that may have considered Section 4 [1] [10].