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Fact check: How have hate crime rates changed since the 2020 presidential election?
Executive Summary
Since the 2020 U.S. presidential election, multiple analyses report election-period spikes in hate crimes and divergent longer-term trends across places: short-term surges around elections are documented in U.S. studies and local police data, while national reporting frameworks and international jurisdictions show both increases and recent decreases depending on time frame and measurement. The picture is mixed and data-dependent, shaped by timing, geography, and under-reporting.
1. What the reports claim when you pull the threads
Analysts converge on two core claims: first, hate incidents and crimes often spike around U.S. elections; second, longer-term trends vary by jurisdiction and data source. A 2024 academic study quantifies a 28% average increase in the three weeks surrounding presidential elections [1]. The Leadership Conference Education Fund argued reported hate crimes “increase during elections” and highlighted 2021 as the highest year since 1991 [2]. Local LAPD data found a 45% rise in the six-week period around the 2020 election and noted steady growth in Los Angeles since 2014 [3]. These claims focus on temporal clustering and local intensification of incidents.
2. Election-period spikes: numbers and immediate context
The strongest, most consistent finding across U.S.-focused pieces is short-term amplification of hate crimes during election cycles. The 28% average increase study (April 2024) uses a multi-election analytic approach to isolate election timing effects [1]. The Leadership Conference report (April 2023) frames elections as recurring catalysts that correlate with reported increases, citing a surge in 2021 compared with prior years [2]. Local evidence, like LAPD’s 45% increase around the 2020 election, provides on-the-ground examples of how those short-term dynamics play out, reinforcing a pattern of election-associated upticks [3].
3. Local surges versus national recorded trends in the U.S.
Local police departments and advocacy studies can show sharp, short-term rises that are not always mirrored in national annual totals. The LAPD’s year-2020 figures (335 hate crimes in less than 11 months) and a 45% six-week spike highlight intense local variation [3]. By contrast, national-level summaries cited by advocacy groups note broad increases since 2015 and record highs reported in 2021 [2]. This divergence signals that timing windows and geographic granularity matter: a concentrated spike can coexist with broader up-and-down national yearly totals that depend on reporting practices and aggregation choices.
4. International counterexamples dampen a simple “everywhere up” narrative
Data from other jurisdictions complicate a universal-rise story. The UK Home Office published a 5% decrease in recorded hate crimes for the year ending March 2024 (140,561 offences) and highlighted improved police recording practices since 2014 [4] [5]. Canada’s preliminary 2024 police-reported quarterly data show 2,384 hate crimes in the first half of 2024, with race/ethnicity the largest target [6]. These figures show country-specific trajectories: some places report short-term declines or stabilization while others document continued increases, depending on measurement and timeframe.
5. Recent regional findings underline persistent rises in some places
Provincial and state-level reporting and studies from 2024–2025 show substantial rises in certain regions. A 2025 Canadian analysis reported a 239% increase in hate crimes between 2016–23 and flagged under-reporting, especially for Black and Muslim communities [7]. California-focused surveys and hotline reports from 2024–25 estimate millions directly experienced hate acts or submitted over 1,200 hotline reports in 2024; racial/ethnic bias formed a plurality of reports [8] [9]. These data point to sustained, localized escalation even as other national datasets register declines or stability.
6. Measurement problems and why numbers can tell different stories
All sources caution—implicitly or explicitly—about under-reporting, changes in recording, and methodological choices. The UK releases emphasize improved recording practices that can both raise or lower year-to-year totals depending on adjustments [4] [5]. Canadian and U.S. analyses repeatedly note under-reporting by marginalized groups and that surveys capture many incidents outside police records [7] [8]. Short-window studies capture spikes but can overstate long-term trends; annual reports smooth episodic shocks but may obscure election-linked surges [1] [2] [3].
7. Politics, advocacy, and possible agendas embedded in the framing
Different authors use these findings to advance varying narratives: advocacy groups emphasize rising threats and call for policy responses [2] [7], local police reports highlight operational spikes and community impacts [3], and government statistical releases contextualize changes within recording improvements [4] [5]. Each stake suggests distinct priorities—from resource allocation to civil-rights enforcement—so readers should interpret claims in light of potential advocacy goals and institutional incentives affecting data presentation.
8. Bottom line — what changed since the 2020 election?
Since 2020 the clearest, most reproducible effect is that U.S. presidential elections coincide with measurable short-term increases in reported hate crimes; local law enforcement and academic studies document pronounced election-period spikes [1] [3]. Longer-term trends are heterogeneous: some U.S. and Canadian analyses show marked increases through 2023–25, while UK national data show a recent decrease for year ending March 2024 [2] [7] [4]. The overall conclusion: hate crime dynamics after 2020 vary by place and measurement window, with election-linked surges a persistent pattern amid uneven longer-term trajectories [1] [2] [4] [7].