Have conservatives become conservative in the last 20 years?

1. Growth of the ideological “tails”: clearer conservative consistency among Republicans

Surveys show the share of Americans at the ideological extremes has roughly doubled over twenty years, and within that pattern Republicans have become more uniformly conservative: the fraction of Republicans who answer in consistently conservative ways on multi‑item scales rose from the low single digits/teens in the 1990s–2000s to about 20% in recent Pew analyses, and Gallup finds a higher share of Republicans self‑identifying as conservative today than in 1994 (77% vs. 58%) ^{[4] [1] [2]}.

2. Social conservatism has ticked up recently, driven largely by Republican identification

Polling focused on social issues (abortion, gender, cultural questions) records a notable uptick in social conservatism since 2021, especially among Republicans—Gallup and other polling show Republican social conservatism climbing substantially in a short period and driving part of the recent rightward movement on cultural questions ^{[3] [5]}.

3. Economic conservatism is steadier; the public mixes labels across domains

On economic questions U.S. adults have been more stable: large pluralities historically describe themselves as economically conservative or moderate, and commentators note that Americans may be conservative on economics while liberal on some social issues, so “becoming conservative” depends on which dimension is measured; some recent commentators argue economic conservatism remains widespread while the recent rightward movement is concentrated on culture and identity ^{[5] [3]}.

4. Partisan realignment and the shrinking center amplify the impression of “more conservative”

The political map has polarized—fewer people occupy a centrist mix of positions and more are consistently liberal or conservative, so parties look more ideologically pure; Pew documents the shrinking center and growing tails, with both Democrats moving left and Republicans moving right, which increases perception of conservative entrenchment even if the overall population shifts are uneven ^{[4] [1]}.

5. Not uniform across age, region, or elite levels; elites and voters can diverge

Scholars note asymmetries: Republican moderates have declined and conservative identifiers grew (Brookings), but elite officeholders, media figures, and grassroots activists do not always move in lockstep with average voters; analyses of polarization emphasize that elected officials and party activists may be further to the extremes than the median voter, producing consequential policy outcomes even if the entire public moved only modestly ^{[6] [7]}.

6. Historical and interpretive context: cycles, fusionism, and possible reversals

Conservatism’s strength has waxed and waned historically, and contemporary conservatism contains new elements—right‑wing populism fused with traditional conservatism—so the present rise can be read as both a return to sharper ideological identity and a realignment of what “conservative” means in practice; analysts warn that short‑term spikes (e.g., reaction to administrations) can look like enduring shifts but may also be cyclical ^{[8] [9] [10]}.

7. Conclusion and limits of the record

The available polling and analyses indicate conservatives—especially Republican identifiers—are more consistently conservative today than twenty years ago and social conservatism has increased recently, but the broader public shows mixed movement and much depends on which issues, which subgroups, and which institutional actors are measured; the reviewed sources provide robust evidence for increased ideological consistency and partisan sorting but do not settle every causal mechanism or predict long‑term permanence ^{[1] [2] [3]}.