Fact check: Are there historical examples of presidents trying to extend tenure without formal election (e.g., Andrew Jackson era norms)?

1. What people claimed: Presidents tried to sidestep limits — a mixed record of success and failure

The materials assert that incumbents sometimes try to remain in power beyond conventional limits, using constitutional changes, reinterpretations, or extra-constitutional tactics, and estimate that about one-third of incumbents who reached term ends tried to stay ^[4]. The U.S. historical claims focus on two contrasting periods: the Jacksonian era where norms about rotation and patronage were evolving and presidents asserted broader democratic mandates ^{[5] [6]}, and the FDR era, where electoral success produced an unprecedented third and fourth term, prompting the 22nd Amendment ^{[1] [2]}. Contemporary analyses extend those precedents into hypothetical modern strategies and warn of attempts to exploit legal loopholes or political institutions ^{[3] [7]}. These claims frame both legal and extra-legal pathways as recurring features of executive ambition.

2. What history actually shows: Jackson’s norms versus FDR’s constitutional break

The historical record shows distinct dynamics: Andrew Jackson expanded presidential profile and asserted mass democratic legitimacy but operated within an evolving party system and congressional restraints; he did not attempt to legally abolish term limits, though his era reshaped expectations about executive leadership ^{[5] [6]}. By contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s successful runs in 1940 and 1944 directly prompted a constitutional reaction — the ratification of the 22nd Amendment in 1951 to prevent future multi-term presidencies ^{[1] [2]}. Jackson’s legacy is about norms and political practice, while FDR’s precedent is about electoral success creating a structural change. Both show that ambition can reshape institutions, but the mechanisms and consequences differ sharply.

3. How incumbents worldwide have attempted tenure extension — legal tools and subversions

The examples summarized emphasize three broad methods used by leaders to extend tenure: constitutional amendments or reinterpretations, judicial reworkings of eligibility rules, and extra-constitutional maneuvers such as manipulating succession, using loyal legislatures, or coercing institutions ^[4]. The documents note that roughly one-third of incumbents reaching term ends have attempted extension in some form ^[4]. U.S.-specific suggested tactics that commentators have discussed recently include repealing the 22nd Amendment, exploiting constitutional ambiguities, or relying on loyal actors to circumvent constraints — strategies experts say are legally fraught and politically destabilizing ^{[3] [7]}. These pathways mirror global patterns where weak checks enable tenure extension, while robust constitutional protections and independent institutions constrain it.

4. Contemporary warnings: analysts see plausible threats but legal roadblocks in the U.S.

Recent analysis of contemporary actors emphasizes both rhetorical flirtation and concrete legal obstacles. Commentators in 2025 note public statements and strategic proposals about seeking a third term or remaining in power through unconventional means; however, legal scholars stress the clarity of the 22nd Amendment and the constitutional difficulties any such attempt would face ^{[8] [3]}. Proposed maneuvers — for example, having a surrogate win then resign to enable succession, invoking the 25th Amendment, or attempting repeal — are discussed in the sources as theoretically conceivable but practically complicated and likely unconstitutional without broad institutional collapse or cooperation ^[7]. Analysts caution that public rhetoric about third-term ambitions can matter even if actual legal realization is unlikely ^[8].

5. How historians and legal scholars disagree — motives, feasibility, and precedent weight

Scholars diverge on whether Jackson-era norms offer a true precedent for modern tenure-extension schemes. Some argue Jackson demonstrates how norms, party control, and patronage can expand executive influence short of formal tenure extension ^{[5] [6]}. Others point to FDR as the decisive turning point showing that electoral supremacy can trigger structural reform — the 22nd Amendment — reducing the persuasive power of earlier norm-based precedents ^{[1] [2]}. Legal analysts disagree about the feasibility of modern workarounds: some outline complex but imaginable routes that would likely spark litigation and institutional resistance, while others emphasize that constitutional text and institutional resilience make such routes near-impossible without a broader constitutional crisis ^{[3] [8]}. Thus the weight of precedent differs by the type of tactic under discussion.

6. Missing context and final synthesis: institutions matter more than rhetoric

The materials underplay certain considerations: the role of state administrations, the judiciary’s independence, and military/nonstate actor responses in preventing tenure grabs, as well as the political costs of overt constitutional manipulation ^{[4] [3]}. International comparisons suggest that where incumbents succeed it is usually because multiple institutions fail or collude; U.S. structural protections like the 22nd Amendment, a committed judiciary, and federal-state checks create high barriers ^{[2] [8]}. In sum, history shows both norm-driven expansions of presidential power and successful formal tenure extensions, but U.S. constitutional design since 1951 places strong legal limits on third-term ambitions; contemporary warnings highlight rhetorical and tactical threats that would still demand extraordinary institutional breakdown to succeed ^{[5] [1] [3]}.