What are historical examples of the 25th Amendment being invoked or seriously considered, and what lessons do they offer for rapid removal?
Executive summary
The 25th Amendment has been used several times to manage brief, voluntary transfers of power and has been seriously considered—but never completed—for removing a president deemed incapacitated; Section 3 has clear short-form precedent while Section 4, the forced-removal mechanism, remains uninvoked because of legal ambiguity and steep political obstacles [1] [2]. Historical episodes involving Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Joe Biden and the post–January 6, 2021 debate over Donald Trump illuminate both how the amendment can work quickly and why it has never been used to forcibly remove a sitting president [3] [1] [4].
1. Reagan’s shootings and surgeries: crisis planning versus formal invocation
After the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1981, White House officials prepared paperwork to have Vice President George H.W. Bush serve as acting president under the 25th Amendment, but the documents were never signed and the move was not completed, illustrating how close crises can push aides to consider the mechanism even if it is not executed [3] [5]. In 1985 Reagan’s administration used the form and language of Section 3 during colon surgery, but contemporaneous accounts and later archival notes disagree over whether that was a formal invocation—some sources say the White House treated it as an invocation while others say Reagan decided not to officially invoke Section 3 and merely followed its form—underscoring early ambiguity about routine, temporary transfers [6] [3].
2. Routine, voluntary transfers: Bush and Biden precedent for speed
Section 3’s text has been used as a predictable, fast mechanism when presidents voluntarily cede authority for medical procedures: George W. Bush transferred power twice during routine colonoscopies and Joe Biden did so for a brief medical procedure in November 2021, demonstrating that Section 3 can enable a nearly instantaneous, noncontroversial handoff when the president cooperates [1] [7]. Those precedents show how rapid removal of duties can work when the president agrees to a temporary transfer and follows the amendment’s notification requirements to Congress [8] [1].
3. January 6, 2021: the most serious modern attempt at Section 4
In the immediate aftermath of the January 6 Capitol attack, senior administration officials and congressional leaders considered asking Vice President Mike Pence to invoke Section 4 to declare President Trump incapacitated, but Pence refused and no formal process was initiated, highlighting the political limits of removing a sitting president absent the president’s assent [4] [9] [2]. That episode is the clearest recent example of Section 4 being seriously contemplated and shows how intra-administration divisions, loyalty dynamics, and fear of political fallout can short-circuit the amendment even in moments many perceived as grave [4] [2].
4. Why Section 4 has never been used: legal and political headwinds
Section 4 requires the vice president and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments—or a body Congress might designate—to declare inability, and it contemplates a dramatic transfer of power that can be contested by the president and ultimately decided by Congress, making it legally complex and politically explosive; scholars and historians note that due to its gravity the forced-removal provision has never been invoked and would likely push the nation into fraught constitutional territory [1] [10] [2]. The combination of procedural hurdles, the prospect of litigation, and the need for coalition discipline among cabinet officials explains why rapid, involuntary removal has been theorized more often than implemented [3] [1].
5. Lessons for any effort at “rapid removal”
First, voluntary cooperation (Section 3) is the fastest and least divisive route—past presidents who needed brief incapacitation relief used it promptly, setting a practical template [1]. Second, successful use of Section 4 would require pre-existing political consensus and clear medical or behavioral evidence to overcome constitutional ambiguity and withstand likely legal and congressional fights [10] [2]. Third, reliance on ad hoc staff action without formal, public documentation invites controversy and conflicting narratives, as Reagan-era disputes over whether an invocation occurred illustrate [6] [3].
6. Conclusion: power, law and political reality
The amendment’s history is a study in contrasts: it functions cleanly for cooperative, temporary transfers of power yet remains untested—and therefore risky—for forcible removals; historical episodes show the mechanics for speed exist but also reveal that legal design, political loyalty, evidentiary standards, and the specter of institutional damage all shape whether removal will be rapid or stall before it begins [1] [2] [3].