What historical examples exist of populist movements outliving their founders, and what lessons apply to Trumpism?
Executive summary
Populist movements have repeatedly outlived their founders by institutionalizing ideas, migrating into existing parties, or spawning successor organizations; the U.S. Populist (People’s) Party of the 1890s is an archetypal case where activists and ideas persisted even after the party’s collapse [1] [2]. Contemporary scholarship and data show populism is serial and adaptable across contexts, which means Trumpism’s durability will depend less on one man and more on whether its rhetoric, networks, and institutions survive beyond his personal leadership [3] [4].
1. The 1890s Populists: ideas that moved into other parties
The People’s Party — the classic U.S. Populist movement of the early 1890s — effectively dispersed its people and program into the political mainstream after electoral defeats: many former Populists joined the farmer-labor wing of the Democratic Party or moved into progressive Republican or socialist currents, carrying the movement’s social-justice ideals forward even as the formal party faded [1] [2]. Historians like Charles Postel and archival scholarship underline that the movement’s activists did not disappear but realigned, making the Populist example a cautionary template: organizational collapse does not erase durable grievances or policy legacies [1].
2. Serial populism: patterns from the 20th century to today
Empirical work tracking populist leaders over the last century finds that countries experiencing one populist government are statistically more likely to see another later, reflecting a serial dynamic in which populism recurs rather than dying out with a leader [3]. That research also ties populist governance to political instability and economic costs, underscoring that durable populist currents can have long institutional effects even where individual figures come and go [3].
3. Populism as a style and discursive logic that can outlast founders
Scholarly frameworks emphasize that populism functions less as a fixed ideology and more as a discursive logic or political style that constructs “the people” versus “the elite,” which allows movements to persist without a single charismatic founder by reproducing the same binary and performative repertoire across leaders and contexts [4]. This concept explains how movements can reappear under new banners or leaders: the rhetorical toolkit and grievance frame survive and are portable [4].
4. Varieties and institutionalization: European and global permutations
Recent analyses of right‑wing populism in Europe and elsewhere show that populist parties and leaders have taken different institutional routes—some have built durable parties that survive leadership turnover, others remained leader-centric and fragmented—so survival is contingent on whether a movement builds party machines, media ecosystems, and local organizations rather than relying solely on spectacle [5] [6]. The split between nationalist instincts and transnational MAGA affinity in Europe during recent controversies illustrates how national contexts can fracture seemingly similar populist coalitions even while the underlying style persists [6].
5. Media, spectacle, and organizational durability in Trumpism
Trumpism’s strength derives in part from mediatized spectacle and a personalized “I versus them” ethos that cultivates loyalty to an individual, but media-driven charisma alone does not guarantee institutional continuity; movements that convert media momentum into local organizations, party infrastructure, legal teams, and policy networks are likelier to outlast founders [7] [4]. The lesson is twofold: personalization accelerates mobilization but institutionalization determines longevity [7] [3].
6. Lessons and warning signs for Trumpism’s future
Historical and empirical evidence suggests three practical lessons: first, grievance frames and rhetorical repertoires can survive leader exit by migrating into other parties or institutional forms [1] [4]; second, seriality means Trumpism is more likely to recur unless underlying socioeconomic drivers and institutional vulnerabilities are addressed, since one populist government predicts others [3]; third, whether Trumpism becomes a durable force depends on its ability to build durable organizations and policy coalitions rather than rely solely on a single charismatic figure and media spectacle [7] [5]. Contemporary scholars also warn that populist durability often brings institutional strain and democratic erosion, a risk implicit in the global patterns documented by political scientists [3] [5].