What are historical instances when the 25th Amendment was used for temporary transfers of power, and how do they differ from an involuntary removal?
Executive summary
The 25th Amendment has been used several times for brief, voluntary transfers of presidential authority—most commonly when presidents undergo medical procedures—while the involuntary-removal mechanism in Section 4 has never been invoked; historical accounts differ on exactly which episode counts as the “first” formal invocation (Reagan 1985 versus George W. Bush 2002) [1] [2] [3]. Section 3 is a straightforward, president-initiated letter to congressional leaders that makes the vice president acting president for a defined interval, whereas Section 4 contemplates a contested, multi-step process involving the vice president, a majority of Cabinet and ultimately Congress to declare incapacity [4] [1].
1. Documented, brief transfers: who, when, and why
Presidents have most often used the amendment’s Section 3 to hand off authority temporarily when facing anesthesia or short medical procedures: Ronald Reagan transferred authority while undergoing colon surgery in 1985 (although contemporaneous accounts differ on whether Reagan’s team formally called it an invocation of the 25th Amendment) [5] [3]; George W. Bush invoked Section 3 explicitly in 2002 during a colonoscopy (and again during a later medical procedure, by congressional accounts) making Vice President Dick Cheney acting president for the intervening hours [2] [1]; and more recently President Joe Biden used Section 3 for a brief medical procedure in November 2021 [6] [7]. These instances are widely described as brief, routine and voluntary transfers intended to preserve continuity during predictable, short-term incapacity [4] [8].
2. How Section 3 operates in practice: a paper trail and a pause in authority
Section 3 requires the president to submit a written declaration to the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate that he or she is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office,” at which point the vice president becomes acting president until a second written declaration restores authority to the president [3] [1]. The mechanism is intentionally low‑conflict: the president remains in office, the transfer is explicitly temporary, and the vice president exercises “all the powers and tools of the office” only for the declared period, with no change in succession or removal status [2] [4].
3. Section 4: the never‑used involuntary path and its high threshold
Section 4 provides a route for an involuntary transfer when the president is unwilling or unable to declare incapacity, but it has never been invoked in U.S. history [4] [9]. Under that provision the vice president together with a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments—or another body Congress may designate—can transmit a written declaration that the president is unable to discharge the duties of office, immediately making the vice president acting president; the president can then contest the declaration, triggering a 21‑day congressional resolution process to decide the issue [4] [1]. The multi‑actor design intentionally raises the bar to prevent partisan or opportunistic removals, but also makes Section 4 politically fraught and practically difficult to deploy [8] [9].
4. Core differences between temporary transfer and involuntary removal
The most salient difference is voluntariness and duration: Section 3 is a voluntary, time‑limited handoff initiated by the president and reversed by the president’s written certification, while Section 4 contemplates an involuntary, contested declaration by the vice president and a majority of Cabinet [1] [4]. Legally the president under Section 3 remains president but cedes functions temporarily; under Section 4 the vice president becomes acting president until the dispute is resolved and the president can be displaced from authority in practice even while remaining titular president unless Congress reverses the Cabinet’s declaration [4] [1]. Politically, Section 3 is routine and uncontroversial—used around medical care—whereas Section 4 carries deep constitutional and partisan risk, which helps explain why it has never been used despite periodic calls to do so in moments of crisis [8] [9].
5. Ambiguities, disputes and the record
Historical narratives differ: some sources credit Reagan’s 1985 surgery as the first practical use of Section 3 while others emphasize George W. Bush’s 2002 transfer as the first explicit invocation; both facts appear in reputable accounts, reflecting distinctions between formal paperwork and political framing [5] [2] [3]. Likewise, scholars and officials note that Section 4’s wording—especially the undefined term “unable”—leaves room for dispute about standards and procedures, which is why Congress and commentators have debated whether to create a neutral body to advise on incapacity determinations [1] [4].