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How did the 2024 election voting machine security measures differ from those in 2020?
Executive summary
Election officials and security experts told a familiar story heading into 2024: more scrutiny of voting machines after 2020, continued emphasis on paper records and audits, and focused warnings about software and insider-access vulnerabilities [1] [2]. Reporting shows officials stressed testing, isolation from the internet and physical controls in 2024, while researchers and critics pointed to new findings and software-breach concerns that were not fully resolved before the election [3] [4] [2].
1. A baseline of continuity: testing, paper records and audits stayed central
Election administrators in 2024 leaned on the same pillars that drove post‑2020 reforms: pre‑ and post‑election testing of equipment, reliance on voter‑verifiable paper records where available, and risk‑limiting audits to confirm electronic tallies—practices long promoted by groups such as the Brennan Center and explained by news outlets covering 2024 administration choices [1] [3] [5]. These measures reflect a continuity from the post‑2020 push to reduce reliance on paperless electronic machines and increase verifiability [1].
2. More public scrutiny and rumor dynamics than new centralized federal rules
Unlike a single nationwide overhaul, 2024 saw heightened public attention, media analysis and rumor activity about machines rather than a single federal-level change to how machines were secured; researchers warned that machine rumors and conspiracy narratives from 2020 remained potent and were shaping the conversation in 2024 [6]. Journalists and analysts emphasized that many jurisdictions continued using established security practices—isolated networks, physical custody controls, and scanning for vulnerabilities—while battling misinformation about “hackable” machines [3] [7].
3. New technical findings and patching — but uneven deployment
Security researchers published new vulnerability work in 2024, such as studies of ballot‑scanner data issues and other flaws; vendors sometimes issued patches after disclosure, yet officials in some places delayed updates until after the election to avoid changing certified systems close to voting [4]. University researchers documented vulnerabilities and provided fixes or sanitation tools, while some secretaries of state publicly resisted mid‑cycle changes on the grounds that altering certified systems could create other risks [4].
4. Software‑breach worries: a louder warning than in 2020, with unresolved risk questions
A coalition of computer scientists and election security experts warned in late 2023 that efforts to access voting system software and distribute it to political allies after 2020 created “serious threats” heading into 2024, calling for federal probes and risk assessments; those warnings focused on software access and insider threats rather than broad claims of remote mass manipulation [2]. Reporting documented that the breaches affected equipment from major vendors that together represent the bulk of ballots cast in the U.S., raising questions about supply‑chain and access controls even as everyday election operations emphasized isolation and testing [2].
5. Local variation mattered more in 2024 than a single national policy shift
Because U.S. elections are decentralized, differences between 2020 and 2024 are largely visible at the state and county level: some jurisdictions accelerated replacements of paperless machines, others maintained existing certified devices and focused on procedural controls, and some pursued litigation or audits after the fact [1] [3]. That decentralization means comparisons must be specific to the county or state—national narratives mix robust auditing practices in many places with gaps and slow updates in others [1].
6. The information environment amplified impact beyond technical changes
Researchers and outlets stressed that the social — not strictly technical — environment changed after 2020: lingering conspiracy theories and intensified rumor flows shaped public perceptions in 2024, forcing election officials to spend more time countering disinformation even when machines were tested and isolated from networks [6] [7] [8]. This heightened communications burden is a practical security concern: public distrust can undermine confidence in otherwise routine security practices [6] [8].
7. What reporters and experts say is still unsettled or legally contested
Post‑election lawsuits and reporting raised fresh questions about specific machines, testing labs and alleged unauthorized changes in some locales, but many claims remain unproven or are the subject of litigation and investigation [9]. Available sources do not present a single definitive national finding that 2024 machines were either broadly more secure or more compromised than in 2020; instead, reporting documents a mix of technical fixes, lingering vulnerabilities flagged by researchers, and continued emphasis on audits and paper ballots as the core mitigations [4] [2] [1].
Bottom line: compared with 2020, 2024 featured no single sweeping nationwide technical overhaul of voting machines; it featured intensified scrutiny, more public debate and new technical disclosures and warnings — coupled with continued reliance on paper records, testing and audits as the primary security measures [1] [2] [4].