How did the kurds of irak gain self autonomy? did they use force like pkk or so?

1. A century of political struggle, punctuated by armed revolt

Iraqi Kurdish demands for autonomy date back to the immediate post‑World War I era and reappear repeatedly across the twentieth century, crystallizing into sustained insurgency from 1961 onward under leaders like Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party ^{[7] [8]}. That insurgency produced periodic peace deals—the landmark March 1970 autonomy agreement—and further wars, including the collapse of hopes for full implementation in 1974–75 and renewed fighting that demonstrated that violence was a constant instrument of Kurdish pressure on Baghdad ^{[9] [10] [8]}.

2. The role of armed Kurdish forces (Peshmerga and party militias)

The military backbone of Kurdish leverage was indigenous: Peshmerga and party militias tied to the KDP and later the PUK fought government offensives, sheltered populations in the mountains, and in some periods exercised effective control on the ground—actions that created facts on the map and bargaining power in negotiations ^{[4] [3]}. These forces fought conventional counter‑insurgency battles with Iraqi armies in the 1960s–70s and later defended Kurdish areas against Saddam’s campaigns, most brutally in the Anfal campaign of the late 1980s ^{[4] [11]}.

3. External patrons and the turning point of 1991

The decisive turn toward durable autonomy was not purely Kurdish military success but international intervention: after the 1991 Gulf War, Western powers enforced no‑fly zones that prevented Baghdad from reasserting control, enabling Kurds to administer their territory and hold elections in 1992—de facto autonomy that would later be formalized in Iraq’s post‑Saddam constitutional order ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Historical ties to outside patrons—at times covert U.S. support in the 1970s and later explicit Western protection—were critical to Kurdish survival and institutionalization ^{[5] [12]}.

4. From de facto rule to constitutional recognition (2003–2005)

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam’s regime allowed Iraqi Kurdish leaders to convert de facto authority into formal politics: Kurdish parties negotiated into the new Iraqi order, and the 2005 constitution recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity with significant autonomy ^{[3] [13]}. That legal recognition sealed a long process that combined local force projection, political negotiation, and opportunistic diplomacy more than a single decisive military conquest ^{[6] [13]}.

5. How this compares to the PKK model of force

The PKK is a Turkey‑focused guerrilla organization that has pursued an armed insurgency across borders, rooted in an urban‑rural militant doctrine with ideological underpinnings distinct from the tribal‑party structures of Iraqi Kurdistan; Iraqi Kurds relied on party-based Peshmerga, territorial administration, and state‑level negotiation rather than the PKK’s cross‑border guerrilla insurgency and clandestine cell structures ^{[7] [4]}. External support and international protection were decisive for Iraqi autonomy in ways that distinguish it from the PKK’s long insurgency against Ankara, though both histories share that Kurdish nationalism has often combined political and military tools ^{[5] [7]}.

6. Costs, caveats and enduring tensions

The Kurdish route to autonomy exacted heavy costs—massacres, displacement, and intra‑Kurdish civil wars between the KDP and PUK—and left unresolved disputes such as the contested status of Kirkuk and periodic frictions with Baghdad and regional states, demonstrating that autonomy was partial, fragile, and dependent on external circumstances ^{[4] [6] [13]}. Sources describe Kurdish autonomy as the product of armed struggle, negotiated agreements, and international intervention; none portray it as a straightforward mirror of the PKK model, and reporting does not substitute a complete military or legal history beyond these summaries ^{[3] [1] [2]}.