How do RAND, Chatham House, and Brookings quantify the risk of major‑power war in their public reports?
Executive summary
RAND quantifies major‑power war risk primarily with quantitative, scenario‑based modelling that measures shifts in national power, simulates campaign costs, and explicitly maps escalation pathways—including nuclear thresholds—while cautioning its frameworks are focused on balance‑of‑power drivers [1] [2] [3]. Chatham House treats the risk as a product of expert-led horizon‑scanning and narrative analysis of flashpoints, rhetoric and institutional erosion rather than formal probabilistic models, producing qualitative alerts about escalation dynamics and systemic stressors [4] [5] [6]. Brookings cannot be evaluated from the materials provided here because no Brookings analysis was included in the search results; this gap constrains any comparison (no citation available).
1. RAND’s toolbox: numbers, scenarios, and escalation mapping
RAND’s public work frequently translates geopolitical change into measurable variables, then runs scenario analyses to identify when shifts in power might portend conflict; the report “Measuring Power, Power Cycles, and the Risk of Great‑Power War” lays out a quantitative, scenario‑based approach for policymakers to measure national power, test shocks, and identify periods of heightened risk tied to relative power trajectories [1]. Beyond macro metrics, RAND publishes campaign‑level and escalation studies—examining the operational implications of long‑range strike options, target sets, and the specific risks of nuclear escalation in a U.S.–China conflict—that map how conventional operations can interact with strategic deterrence and raise escalation risk [2]. RAND also explicitly flags the limits of its methods: its balance‑of‑power framework is versatile but does not capture great‑power conflict risks unrelated to power shifts, meaning political accidents, domestic politics, or misperception‑driven crises may be underweighted [1].
2. RAND’s indicators: what gets measured and why it matters
The measurable indicators RAND emphasizes include changes in military and economic capabilities, relative trajectories of national power, campaign cost‑equivalencies, and the operational availability of strike platforms and munitions—variables used to plot viable targets, assess conventional options, and estimate escalation probability in concrete scenarios [2] [3]. This orientation produces outputs that read like risk contours tied to capabilities and campaign choices—useful to planners who must translate abstract rivalry into force structure and entanglement calculations—but it reflects RAND’s institutional focus on decision‑relevant modelling and wargaming rather than probabilistic forecasts divorced from operational detail [1] [7].
3. Chatham House: expert judgement, narratives, and horizon‑scanning
Chatham House approaches the risk question with qualitative synthesis: expert commentary, magazine pieces and thematic reviews that identify “crunch moments,” flashpoints, rhetorical escalations (including nuclear rhetoric), and erosion of arms‑control norms as drivers that raise the likelihood of major‑power confrontation [5] [4]. The institute packages analysis for policymakers and the public by connecting geopolitical trends—shifts in alliances, supply‑chain vulnerabilities, and nuclear rhetoric—to potential instability, prioritizing interpretive judgement and policy prescription over formal scoring models [6]. Chatham House’s output signals risk through narrative amplification of specific threats and scenario sketches, making it a diagnostic and normative voice rather than a provider of numerical odds [4] [5].
4. Indicators and implicit agendas: why method choice matters
The differences in method reflect institutional roles: RAND’s modelling is tailored for defense planners who need quantified scenarios and operational tradeoffs, which can privilege capability metrics and escalation mechanics [1] [2]; Chatham House’s emphasis on commentary and horizon‑scanning serves diplomats, journalists and policymakers seeking holistic, normative analysis of systemic risks and political drivers [6] [5]. Both approaches carry biases: quantified models can underplay non‑material triggers of war, while narrative analyses can magnify certain flashpoints through selection effects; the reporting available calls attention to these methodological limits rather than resolving them [1] [5].
5. What’s missing and the comparative take
A direct account of how Brookings quantifies major‑power war risk is absent from the provided materials, preventing a full tri‑think‑tank comparison; that omission should temper any claim about consensus across the three institutions (no citation available). Based on the sources at hand, RAND operationalizes risk with quantitative scenarios and escalation mapping focused on balance‑of‑power metrics and campaign dynamics [1] [2] [3], while Chatham House communicates risk through expert-led narrative analysis and horizon‑scanning that spotlights political, normative and rhetorical accelerants to conflict [4] [5] [6].