How does the uae finance the conflict in sudan

1. Allegations of direct military financing and materiel transfers

Multiple sources assert that the UAE has supplied weapons, military hardware and logistics to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) or facilitated transfers that empowered the militia, claims that Sudan elevated to an ICJ filing accusing the UAE of “fuelling the rebellion” and supporting forces accused of atrocities ^{[2] [1]}; US lawmakers and investigative reporting have echoed findings that link Emirati channels to arms and equipment reaching RSF-held areas even as Abu Dhabi rejects the accusations ^{[1] [5]}.

2. Mercenaries, recruitment and pay: human capital as a line item

Reporting documents claims that fighters have been recruited, paid and even transported in ways tied to Emirati interests—Sudanese fighters were prominent in Gulf deployments historically and analysts say similar recruitment and payments have re-emerged in ways that benefit proxy forces in Sudan, a pattern observers interpret as a form of financing the conflict through manpower ^{[7] [1] [8]}.

3. Gold, trade flows and the commercial lifeline to conflict finance

A clear material channel is gold: analysts and policy papers show wartime spikes in artisanal mining and exports, with much of Sudan’s gold reportedly sold into Dubai; researchers and the European Council on Foreign Relations argue Dubai’s market has acted as the principal buyer for gold from both RSF- and SAF-controlled areas, creating a revenue stream that funds fighting on the ground ^{[3] [7]}. Independent experts monitoring embargoes have described smuggling routes into Chad and onward as credible, implicating commercial markets in sustaining armed groups ^{[2] [3]}.

4. Corporate investments, land deals and indirect leverage

Large Emirati investments—banking, agriculture concessions, port and logistics projects—give Abu Dhabi private-sector leverage in Sudan’s economy; academic and media analysis estimate billions invested since 2018 and highlight major Emirati firms operating large agricultural tracts and infrastructure projects that create economic incentives to influence local power brokers, including paramilitaries who control territory and resources ^{[7] [8]}. Critics argue those investments can become de facto financing and political support when revenues, access and security depend on armed actors.

5. Humanitarian diplomacy as a public counterweight

Official UAE statements and MOFA releases emphasize humanitarian donations—UAE pledges and reported OCHA-tracked assistance running into hundreds of millions of dollars—and denounce allegations as disinformation, framing Abu Dhabi as a major donor intent on civilian protection ^{[4] [9] [6]}. This dual posture—large public humanitarian spending alongside accusations of covert support—creates plausible deniability and soft-power cover for Emirati involvement, according to analysts ^{[6] [1]}.

6. Evidence, denials, sanctions and accountability gaps

There is a contested evidentiary landscape: UN experts, investigative journalists and regional analysts have compiled reports that point to UAE-linked channels for arms, gold and payments, while the UAE officially denies providing support and calls some claims propaganda; Sudan’s ICJ case and US statements increase political pressure, and sanctions have been used against figures and companies tied to the RSF, but enforcement and legal accountability remain patchy ^{[2] [5] [10]}. Reporting limitations persist: some claims rely on intercepted shipments, sanctions findings and secondary reporting rather than public, irrefutable government records, and Abu Dhabi continues to assert its primary role is humanitarian ^{[1] [2] [6]}.