How have US election security measures changed since the 2016 Russian interference?

1. From shock to spending: federal money and new partnerships

After intelligence findings about Russian activity in 2016, Congress and federal agencies mobilized to harden elections. The Consolidated Appropriations Act supplied $380 million in HAVA funds in 2018 and a later $425 million to help states upgrade technology, hire cybersecurity personnel, and run audits ^{[1] [2]}. DHS and related agencies also encouraged closer state–federal partnerships and classified the election ecosystem as critical infrastructure, prompting more joint planning and assistance ^[6].

2. Paper, audits and the mechanics of trust

One of the starkest, measurable changes was the move toward auditable paper. Fewer than 80% of ballots were cast on auditable paper in 2016; by 2020 that figure rose to roughly 95% nationwide, with many battleground states adopting paper trails and more transparent pre-election rules and testing ^[3]. Election-security advocates and groups such as the Brennan Center repeatedly highlighted the need to replace aging machines and modernize registration databases—work that funding and state action partially addressed ^[7].

3. Cyber defenses and continuing vulnerabilities

States “scrambled” after 2016 to upgrade cyberdefenses, train officials, and patch voter-registration systems, but cybersecurity advocates warned the funding was insufficient for wholesale equipment replacement or to fix legacy software issues ^{[1] [8]}. Independent reporting and watchdogs continued to flag exposed systems and weak vendor practices; the Brennan Center emphasized antiquated voting infrastructure and unsupported registration software as persistent risks ^{[7] [9]}.

4. Information operations and platform responses

2016’s disinformation campaigns prompted both government and private-sector responses: social-media companies invested in tools to identify impostors and remove foreign influence, while federal entities tried to improve early flagging and public debunking of foreign influence in later cycles ^{[1] [10]}. Analysts credit more coordinated public alerts and counter-messaging in subsequent cycles with blunting some influence operations, though threats evolved and became more sophisticated ^[10].

5. The federal backstop: built, then partially pulled back

The federal apparatus that had supported state and local officials evolved across administrations. CISA and DHS had provided Election Day situation rooms, information-sharing, and operational support; reporting in 2025 says that some federal election-support functions—like CISA’s Election Day situation room—were not operating in the same way, and federal efforts to combat disinformation and provide direct assistance were scaled back ^{[4] [5]}. State officials and election coalitions warned smaller jurisdictions could struggle without that steady federal help ^[5].

6. Politics, personnel and the limits of technical fixes

Election security is as much political as technical. Some accounts describe staffing cuts, halted programs, or personnel changes at federal agencies that had been central to election defense, creating friction between local officials who rely on federal intelligence and policy-makers who reprioritize resources ^{[11] [5]}. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other observers stress that technical improvements do not eliminate procedural vulnerabilities nor the impact of political attacks on officials ^[8].

7. Competing narratives and what reporting does — and does not — say

Sources converge that concrete improvements were made: more funding, more paper ballots, better interagency coordination in later cycles ^{[1] [2] [3] [10]}. They disagree, however, on adequacy and trajectory: advocacy groups and watchdogs argue vulnerabilities remain and funding was insufficient ^{[8] [7]}, while some reporting and government summaries assert improved defenses and successful countermeasures in later elections ^[10]. Recent 2025 reporting documents a contraction of federal hands-on support — a development that raises fresh concerns among state and local officials ^{[4] [5]}.

Limitations: available sources do not mention detailed state-by-state spending breakdowns beyond the HAVA totals, nor do they provide audit-by-audit assessments of every jurisdiction’s security posture (not found in current reporting).