Fact check: How does the IAEA monitor Iran's uranium enrichment levels?

1. Summary of the results

The IAEA monitors Iran's uranium enrichment levels through on-site inspections and verification activities that assess Iran's stockpiles of highly enriched uranium ^{[1] [2]}. These monitoring activities are conducted under Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which allows for routine monitoring and verification of declared nuclear material ^[3].

The monitoring process involves inspectors physically visiting Iranian nuclear sites to evaluate facilities and verify inventories of nuclear material, including uranium enriched to up to 60% purity ^{[4] [5] [6]}. The IAEA's verification work includes assessing damage to uranium enrichment facilities and verifying the absence of increased off-site radiation levels ^[7].

However, the IAEA's monitoring capabilities have been significantly disrupted due to recent military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities ^{[1] [2]}. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has stated that his top priority is for inspectors to return to Iran's nuclear sites, indicating that normal monitoring operations have been suspended ^{[4] [6]}.

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The analyses reveal several critical pieces of context missing from the original question:

• Current operational disruption: Iran's monitoring system is not functioning normally due to recent military strikes on nuclear facilities, making it difficult to determine the extent of damage to facilities like Fordow without on-site inspections ^[7].
• Iran's compliance issues: Iran has recently failed to comply with reporting obligations, which has reduced the IAEA's ability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program ^[3]. This suggests that monitoring depends heavily on Iranian cooperation.
• Scale of enrichment concerns: The last quarterly IAEA report indicated that Iran had enough uranium enriched to up to 60% purity for nine nuclear weapons if enriched further ^[5], highlighting the critical importance of continuous monitoring.
• Diplomatic efforts: Director General Grossi has proposed meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Abbas Araghchi to discuss resuming cooperation, indicating that political negotiations are necessary for effective monitoring ^[6].

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original question presents monitoring as an ongoing, routine process without acknowledging the current crisis in IAEA-Iran relations. This framing could mislead readers into believing that monitoring is proceeding normally when, in fact, verification activities have been disrupted ^{[1] [2]}.

The question also fails to mention that effective monitoring depends on Iranian compliance and cooperation, not just IAEA capabilities ^[3]. This omission could create a false impression that the IAEA has independent, unrestricted access to Iranian facilities.

Additionally, the question doesn't reflect the urgency of the current situation, where the IAEA needs to determine how much of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile remains intact after recent attacks ^[5], making this more than a routine monitoring question but rather a critical verification challenge with immediate nuclear security implications.