What ideologies and organizational structures drive far-right political violence compared to far-left violence?
Executive summary
Far-right violence historically produced more attacks and far more fatalities in recent decades; government and academic counts show the right “outpace[s] all other types” of domestic political violence and accounted for the majority of ideologically motivated homicides since 1990 [1] [2]. Recent 2025 research by CSIS and contemporaneous reporting documents a short-term rise in left-wing incidents that, for the first half of 2025, outnumbered right-wing incidents — but analysts and fact-checkers caution that this reversal reflects a drop in right-wing incidents and small absolute numbers on the left, not parity in overall lethality or historical trends [3] [4] [5] [2] [6].
1. Ideological cores: what each side says it fights for
Far-right violence coalesces around exclusionary national identities, white supremacy, anti-immigrant and anti-pluralist narratives and conspiracy-driven grievances; its ideological staples include ethnonationalism, racism, and authoritarianism that justify violence to defend a perceived organic national community [7] [8] [9]. Far-left violence frames itself as opposition to capitalism, imperialism and state authority and often draws on anarchist, Marxist, eco-radical or anti-fascist rhetoric that legitimizes property destruction, sabotage or targeted attacks as means to topple systems perceived as oppressive [10] [11]. Both currents show ideological diversity; scholars warn against neat labelling because movements contain nonviolent political actors, militants and hybrid currents that blur lines [12] [9].
2. Organizational forms: hierarchies, cells, and lone actors
Far-right groups range from formal parties and structured organizations to loose networks and “post-organisational” lone actors and small cells that radicalize online; that mixed architecture — from street movements to clandestine neo‑Nazi cells — enables both organized plots and decentralized attacks [12] [13] [14]. Far-left organizing historically included clandestine cadres and urban guerrillas but in contemporary U.S. cases tends to appear as small affinity groups, ad hoc cells or isolated actors tied to single-issue causes rather than durable hierarchical insurgencies [10] [11]. Experts stress that online subcultures and social media accelerate recruitment and ideological cross‑pollination on both sides [13] [12].
3. Tactics and targets: patterns of harm and lethality
Right-wing violence has produced more fatalities and frequently targets civilians from minority groups, public officials and law-enforcement, with incidents often described as deadlier in recent years [15] [1]. Left-wing incidents reported in 2025 included arson and plots with fewer fatalities; CSIS counted more left incidents than right in H1 2025 but noted the left’s absolute numbers remain small compared with historical right-wing waves [3] [4] [6]. Analysts caution that a short-term numerical reversal does not erase long-term trends where right-wing actors caused the majority of politically motivated deaths in multiple datasets [2] [1].
4. Drivers and accelerants: politics, policy, and platforms
Researchers link waves of left-wing violence since 2016 to polarization around the Trump era and to reactive radicalization tied to perceived state capture — but emphasize the left’s increase comes from a low baseline and political shifts on the right (e.g., perceived policy gains) may depress right-wing violence temporarily [4] [6]. For the far right, scholars point to conspiratorial grievance ecosystems, recruitment via foreign battlefields and online “Siege”-style milieus, and the normalization of extremist narratives in some mainstream forums as drivers of persistence and lethality [16] [7] [14].
5. Counting problems and political uses of data
Multiple experts and outlets note methodological differences across datasets: definitions of “terrorism,” inclusion of vandalism or plots, and time windows change headline conclusions. CSIS’s finding that left incidents outnumbered right in early 2025 drew scrutiny because it combined a steep right‑side decline with a small rise on the left; critics argue headline framing risks overcorrecting public understanding [4] [5] [6]. The DOJ removal of a study showing right-wing homicides predominated illustrates how politically charged research can be weaponized by advocates on both sides [1] [17].
6. What the evidence implies for policy and public debate
Available reporting and studies show political violence in the U.S. spans the ideological spectrum, but that long-term data and multiple analyses still identify the far right as the larger and deadlier source of recent domestic terrorism; short-term upticks on the left merit attention but do not equal historical scale or lethality of right-wing campaigns [2] [1] [4]. Policymakers should tailor responses to differing organizational structures and recruitment vectors — e.g., disrupting online radicalization networks versus investigating transnational training links — and avoid using selective short-term data as justification for one-sided crackdowns [5] [13] [17].
Limitations: sources disagree on interpretation of 2025 data and on definitions of violence; this piece draws only on the provided reporting and analyses and does not include unpublished government datasets or sources beyond the list supplied [3] [5] [2].