How would transferring ICE functions to other agencies change funding flows to border communities?
Executive summary
Transferring ICE functions to other agencies would shift but not necessarily reduce the federal money flowing into border communities because large pools of funding have been locked into border enforcement programs outside annual appropriations and because many programs already route money through DHS, state grants, and private contractors [1] [2]. Political decisions about which agency controls operations — DHS components like CBP, the Department of Defense, or state/local partners — would reallocate contracting, grant, and personnel dollars and could change who benefits locally [3] [1] [4].
1. How current ICE funding reaches border communities today
Much of ICE’s budget supports detention beds, healthcare, guard services, transportation and removal operations, and contracts with private facilities and service providers, which directly channels federal dollars into communities hosting detention centers and contractors [2]. Recent legislation routed unprecedented, multiyear funds to immigration enforcement—including the One Big Beautiful Bill Act dollars that sit largely outside the annual appropriations cycle—ensuring continued flows to enforcement networks even amid political fights [1] [5].
2. If another federal agency absorbed ICE roles, the immediate fiscal mechanics
If a different federal agency inherited detention, removal, or surveillance functions, the legal and budgetary vehicles paying for those functions would likely follow: appropriations and reconciliation balances can be reassigned within DHS or reprogrammed to other departments, and Congress could fashion new grant streams to local partners, preserving local spending even as the nominal payor changes [3] [1] [2]. In practice, previous increases in CBP and DHS funding show how Congress directs large sums to specific border activities like infrastructure and technology—money that could be redirected within DHS or toward another agency’s programs without eliminating local expenditures [3] [5].
3. Role of grants and local agreements in determining who gets paid
State and local agencies already receive dedicated funds—Operation Stonegarden and 287(g)-style support among them—that pay local law enforcement or reimburse jurisdictions for cooperating with federal enforcement, so transferring ICE functions could simply shift which federal office issues those grants while leaving local revenue streams intact [6] [1]. Advocacy groups note that billions were designated to state and local governments for immigration enforcement in recent bills, meaning transfers of responsibility may not reduce incentives for jurisdictions to participate [6] [7].
4. Contractors, surveillance vendors, and the private-sector pipeline
A large portion of enforcement money flows to private contractors for detention, transportation, medical services, and surveillance technology; switching agency oversight would probably preserve these contracting relationships unless Congress or regulators expressly curtailed them, because contractors are paid from program budgets more than from ICE’s institutional identity [2] [8] [9]. Human Rights First and EFF have flagged that expanded funding increases corporate roles in detention and surveillance, indicating a hidden private-sector beneficiary regardless of which federal office holds title to the mission [9] [8].
5. Political leverage, oversight, and conditionality would drive redistribution
Shifting functions could be packaged with reforms that change who receives funds—for example, cutting detention bed counts or boosting inspector general oversight—so budgetary reallocation is possible but depends on congressional choices and political bargains, as shown by appropriations proposals that would reduce beds and alter Border Patrol funding [10] [11]. Conversely, reconciliation-era appropriations and admin flexibility (such as an unrestricted DHS fund and DoD transfers) mean enforcement operations can persist under new labels unless lawmakers act to rescind or reprogram those funds [3] [1].
6. What reporting does not settle and where uncertainty lies
Available reporting documents the size and direction of current enforcement funding and highlights multiyear pots and grant programs, but it does not specify a granular model for how a formal transfer of ICE’s statutory functions would be executed or how every local contract would be re-awarded, so any precise mapping of winners and losers at the municipal level remains contingent on future legislative and administrative choices beyond the present record [1] [2].