Impact of paper ballots on 2024 election audit processes
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Executive summary
Paper ballots were central to 2024 post‑election auditing: over 98% of jurisdictions used systems that produce an auditable paper record and many states ran risk‑limiting audits (RLAs) or hand‑count spot checks to confirm machine tallies [1] [2] [3]. Where full or statewide audits occurred — e.g., Georgia’s statewide review of 5.3 million ballots and Wisconsin’s municipal hand counts of 327,230 ballots — officials reported the audits confirmed the certified outcomes [4] [5] [6].
1. Paper trails made audits possible — and mainstream
Nearly all jurisdictions in 2024 had a paper record to audit: the Election Assistance Commission reported that over 98% of election jurisdictions used equipment producing an auditable paper record, and analysts note that post‑election audits generally compare paper markings to tabulated totals [1] [3]. The Brennan Center and other experts say paper records are foundational to conducting RLAs and other post‑election checks that “verify that voting machines correctly counted ballots” [7] [2].
2. Risk‑limiting audits: statistical checks, not full recounts
RLAs sample paper ballots to provide statistical confidence that an incorrect outcome was not certified; they come in ballot‑level comparison, batch comparison, and ballot polling flavors and are designed to limit the risk that a wrong winner is certified without requiring a full hand count [8] [9] [10]. States varied in method and scope — some used statewide RLAs for federal contests, others performed batch or precinct sampling — but all rely on preserved paper ballots as the evidence source [11] [12].
3. Big, public audits produced reassuring results in key states
Georgia conducted an extraordinary audit that read human‑readable text on all 5.3 million ballots and reported just 87 discrepancies and confirmation that QR‑code tallies matched human‑read text, concluding the winners were the same across 1,955 contests [5]. Wisconsin’s post‑election audit hand‑counted 327,230 ballots — nearly 10% of the state’s total — and the state elections agency reported no ballots were miscounted by machines [6]. Georgia’s Secretary of State publicly posted manifests, batch tallies and a hash to allow third‑party verification [4].
4. Audit design and transparency matter — and differ by state
Audit practices differ on sampling frames, when audits occur relative to certification, and how transparent the process is. North Carolina posted random groupings and seed data so the public can reproduce selections; Pennsylvania and other states publish their RLA procedures and ballot manifests to enable verification [13] [12]. Experts and organizations—including Verified Voting and the MIT Election Lab—stress that RLAs require software‑independent paper trails and careful chain‑of‑custody documentation to be credible [3] [8].
5. Critics say many audits fell short of “strong evidence” despite paper ballots
A post‑2024 evaluation by Free Speech For People and others argued that audits in most swing states “did not provide the necessary strong evidence” to confirm computer‑generated results, concluding that many audit implementations lacked baseline conditions for robust verification [14]. That critique coexists with the factual record that many states ran RLAs or hand audits and that large audits in Georgia and Wisconsin confirmed tabulation accuracy [5] [6] [10].
6. Paper ballots do not automatically solve all audit problems
Paper ballots enable audits, but successful verification requires procedural capacity: accurate ballot manifests, reproducible random selection, public observation, and trained staff to hand‑count and adjudicate voter intent when marks are ambiguous [13] [3] [12]. Several jurisdictions published detailed instructions, seed numbers, and data to increase transparency; where jurisdictions failed to meet these operational standards, observers and analysts raised concerns [13] [14].
7. Legislative and policy changes are reinforcing paper‑based audits
Federal and state policy moves in 2024–25 emphasized paper ballots and manual adjudication as audit foundations: the Election Security Act language and state laws require preserved voter‑verifiable paper records and ballot manifests for auditing and recounts [15] [12]. Advocacy groups and election officials say these changes aim to make audits more uniform and legally robust [2] [8].
8. Bottom line: paper ballots strengthened 2024 audits — but implementation varied
Available reporting shows paper records enabled widespread post‑election auditing in 2024 and produced conclusive confirmations in high‑profile audits like Georgia’s and Wisconsin’s [5] [6]. Yet unionized critiques and state‑by‑state differences show that paper alone isn’t sufficient; audit credibility depends on design, transparency, and execution — conditions some reviewers say were uneven across swing states [14] [3].
Limitations: available sources do not mention long‑term impacts on public confidence beyond immediate audit reports, nor do they uniformly report every state’s audit metrics in a single dataset; assertions above are drawn only from the provided reporting (not found in current reporting).