What do independent analyses (Pew, Migration Policy Institute, Cato) conclude about whether Biden's policies changed enforcement capacity at the border?
Executive summary
Independent analyses reach different but complementary conclusions: the Cato Institute’s deep dive argues Biden did not reduce enforcement capacity and in many metrics increased arrests, detentions, and removals [1] [2], while the Migration Policy Institute documents a system under strain—large numbers of encounters, extensive use of paroles and releases, and a ballooning nondetained docket that point to constrained practical capacity even as policies shifted [3] [4]; Pew documents concrete policy reversals and tweaks (for example, reinstating “Remain in Mexico” in December 2021) that changed procedures though not uniformly the enforcement output [5].
1. Cato: more enforcement activity, not less
Cato’s multi-part analysis, drawing on FOIA-obtained government data, contends the surge in migration began before Biden took office and that the administration, from day one, increased enforcement in many operational measures—Border Patrol arrests, expulsions and removals rose in months after inauguration according to Cato’s read of the data—so the argument that Biden reduced capacity is mistaken in their view [1] [2]. Cato further shifts attention to structural drivers—global Internet access, social media-facilitated smuggling networks, and U.S. labor demand—to argue these forces explain migration flows more than a simple change in presidential will [1].
2. Migration Policy Institute: high encounters, lots of releases, and operational strain
MPI paints a more nuanced picture: from January 2021 through October 2024 authorities logged roughly 8.6 million migrant encounters, many of them repeat crossings, and MPI estimates that more than 5.8 million migrants were paroled or otherwise allowed entry to pursue claims—outcomes that expanded the nondetained immigration docket from about 3.7 million in FY2021 to 8.1 million in FY2024, signaling system stress even amid enforcement actions [3]. MPI notes the administration narrowed asylum access at points but still struggled to translate policy changes into consistent deterrence, and it emphasizes that enforcement outcomes were mixed even as new tools (like CBP One) shifted where and how migrants were processed [3] [4].
3. Pew: policy toggles and procedural changes without simple capacity verdicts
Pew’s summary catalogue of Biden-era immigration policy stresses a string of reversals and adjustments—undoing some Trump-era restrictions, then reimposing measures such as a restarted “Remain in Mexico” policy in December 2021—highlighting that the administration altered procedures that affect migrant flows and processing but does not offer a single judgment that enforcement capacity was uniformly expanded or contracted [5]. Pew’s role here is descriptive: it flags what changed legally and administratively rather than asserting a net increase or decrease in enforcement capacity [5].
4. How to reconcile the differences: definitions, measures, and institutional limits
Part of the disagreement is definitional and methodological: Cato focuses on discrete enforcement metrics (arrests, expulsions, FOIA-based monthly tallies) to argue capacity increased [1] [2], while MPI centers on system outcomes—mass encounters, parole decisions, and a swelling nondetained docket—that reveal operational limits even if certain enforcement actions rose [3]. Pew underscores the policy flips (reinstatements and new initiatives) that complicate simple attributions of cause and effect [5]. Each source also carries perspective-driven emphases—Cato’s libertarian framing highlights structural drivers and FOIA findings, MPI emphasizes systemic capacity and legal pathways, and Pew provides neutral policy chronology—so reading them together gives a fuller picture [1] [3] [5].
5. Bottom line: no single consensus — increased activity, but outcomes show constrained capacity
All three independent analyses converge on a qualified conclusion: Biden-era policies did not plainly dismantle border enforcement capacity; Cato argues enforcement activity rose [1] [2], while MPI and Pew document policy moves and operational realities—large encounter numbers, widespread paroles/releases, and an expanded nondetained docket—that indicate the system’s practical ability to detain, process, and remove people was limited and produced high rates of release or parole even as some enforcement measures continued [3] [5]. Where the sources diverge is how much of the observed release-and-parole dynamic is the product of constrained capacity versus deliberate policy choices; that remains an interpretive gap across the three independent analyses [1] [3] [5].