How do impeachment clauses in the Constitution (treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors) get interpreted by Congress and courts?
Executive summary
Congress has the sole power to impeach in the House and to try impeachments in the Senate; conviction can only remove and potentially disqualify from future office, and impeachment does not preclude criminal prosecution [1] [2]. The Constitution lists treason and bribery explicitly and leaves “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” undefined; Congress, historical practice, and scholarly commentators have shaped that term over time while courts have generally treated impeachment as a political question and played a limited role [3] [2] [4].
1. The text: short, specific words — long practical consequences
The constitutional clauses are compact: the House “shall have the sole Power of Impeachment,” the Senate “shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,” and removal follows conviction for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” [5] [6]. Those short phrases left crucial territory to be filled by practice: who counts as a “civil Officer,” what conduct qualifies as impeachable, and what procedures the Senate must follow [2] [4].
2. Congress writes the playbook: practice, precedent and politics
Because the Constitution vests impeachment power in Congress, the House decides whether to bring articles and the Senate decides procedures and guilt; modern congressional practice and precedent have therefore supplied much of the definition of impeachable conduct, including the flexible, political reading of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” [1] [7]. Deschler’s and other congressional manuals note that any single article can suffice and that the House’s articulation functions as both deterrent and political judgment [8] [9].
3. “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: an elastic phrase shaped by politics and history
Unlike treason and bribery, which have clearer legal meanings, “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” has no single judicial definition; instead, commentators and Congress have treated it as encompassing criminal offenses and political abuses, maladministration, neglect of duty, and abuses of public trust—a body of meaning developed through practice rather than a fixed textual rule [2] [3] [4]. The Framers rejected the broader catch‑all of “maladministration” but nonetheless left room for political offenses and serious misconduct not always coterminous with statutory crimes [3].
4. Courts largely step back: impeachment as a political question
Judicial decisions and legal commentary emphasize that impeachment is “largely unchecked by the judiciary” and often deemed a nonjusticiable political question; the Supreme Court has recognized the Senate’s plenary authority to “try” impeachments without imposing detailed textual limits on Senate procedures [1] [4]. That judicial deference means constitutional boundaries are defined principally by congressional actors, historical practice, and political judgment rather than by continuing court supervision [4].
5. Who counts as impeachable — “civil Officers” and contested boundaries
The Constitution makes the President, Vice President and “all civil Officers” subject to impeachment; Congress has interpreted the class of civil officers broadly in some contexts and narrowly in others, and House committees and precedent have debated whether certain positions fall within that category [10] [4]. The record shows disagreements over scope persist and that Congress’s own decisions and reports perform the primary interpretive work [4].
6. Sanctions and collateral consequences: removal is primary but not exclusive
The Senate’s punishments on conviction are limited to removal and possible disqualification from future office; impeachment and conviction do not shield a person from ordinary criminal prosecution or civil liability [1] [2]. This separation—political removal vs. criminal punishment—has been affirmed repeatedly in constitutional annotations and practice [2].
7. Competing viewpoints and hidden incentives
Legal scholars and institutional actors disagree over whether impeachment should be held to criminal‑law standards, treated as intrinsically political, or constrained by historical framers’ intent; some (e.g., Georgetown commentary) argue impeachment must precede criminal indictment of a sitting President, while others treat impeachment primarily as a legislative check and political remedy [9] [7]. Those differing views reflect institutional incentives: the House can use impeachment to police executive abuse while the Senate’s political calculus controls conviction outcomes [7] [9].
8. What this means in practice: fluid rules, decided by politicians
Because the text is short, the courts defer, and Congress writes most of the rules through precedent and one‑off choices, impeachment remains a political instrument whose legal contours shift with institutional practice and partisan context [1] [7]. Available sources do not mention a single, definitive judicial test that fixes the meaning of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”; instead, congressional debate, historical examples, and scholarly interpretation continue to define the boundary [2] [4].