Is the right spreading more and more misinformation

1. Evidence points to a disproportionate share of high‑impact falsehoods coming from the right

Multiple researchers and outlets observed that the worst viral election and immigration lies in 2024 were concentrated among Trump allies, far‑right groups and sympathetic media ecosystems rather than evenly distributed between left and right, a pattern highlighted by reporting in The Guardian and analysis cited by the Boston Globe ^{[1] [2]}. Fact‑checking projects and post‑election reviews documented a “firehose” of election‑related false claims that were repeatedly traced to right‑aligned narratives about voter fraud and immigration, which researchers warn could inflame partisan conflict ^{[5] [6]}.

2. Structural enablers made right‑wing disinformation easier to spread, but they also helped others

The rise of generative AI, relaxed moderation on some platforms, and the winding down of third‑party fact‑checking programs created technological and institutional conditions that amplified false claims at scale in 2024; these trends were exploited by right‑wing and extremist actors but are not exclusive to them ^{[3] [7] [4]}. Analysts warned that AI tools produced photorealistic fakes, synthetic audio and other fabrications that increased reach and plausibility for campaigns of all ideological origins ^{[3] [7]}.

3. Motives and tactics: political advantage, cultural grievance and organized extremism

Reporting and organizational reviews show distinct motives behind many right‑wing disinformation campaigns—seeking political advantage in tight races, stoking cultural grievances (for example, anti‑immigrant messaging aimed at Latino voters), and weaponizing conspiracy narratives to mobilize bases—while extremist groups used AI and offline tactics to push hateful content into public spaces ^{[2] [7] [8]}. Those same sources also document strategists and platforms explicitly planning to exploit looser moderation and algorithmic amplification to push narratives favorable to right‑wing goals ^[4].

4. Counterpoint: misinformation is not a single‑sided problem, and some reputable sources caution nuance

Several fact‑checking and research outlets emphasize that misinformation originates across the political spectrum and that identifying the worst examples can depend on which topics and timeframes are measured; PolitiFact and other trackers mapped diverse falsehoods through the year, and some analysts stress caution about partisan bias accusations in the misinformation field ^{[5] [6] [1]}. In short, while the heaviest bursts tied to election legitimacy and certain cultural narratives were traced to right‑wing networks, other false claims and AI‑enabled fakes have come from different actors or foreign influence operations as well ^{[3] [2]}.

5. What this means for civic life and next steps for researchers and platforms

Observers and institutions warn that the convergence of partisan targeting, technological ease, and weakening fact‑check regimes threatens democratic trust and public safety unless platforms, researchers and policymakers adapt—recommendations include restoring robust moderation and fact‑checking collaborations, investing in AI detection, and better communicating research to skeptical audiences who allege bias ^{[1] [4] [3]}. Reporting makes clear that identifying a partisan imbalance in who spreads the most consequential falsehoods is not the same as saying misinformation is exclusive to one side; it is, however, a politically consequential asymmetry documented by multiple investigations and trackers ^{[1] [5] [2]}.

Limitations: available sources document 2023–25 trends, election‑year spikes and platform changes; they do not provide a definitive, quantified share of total misinformation by ideology for all media, nor do they settle debates about causal effects on every election outcome—those remain areas for further empirical work ^{[5] [3]}.