Israel is benefiting from kurdwashing
Executive summary
Israel appears to derive political and strategic advantage from foregrounding ties to Kurdish causes—a practice critics call “Kurdwashing”—even as its historical and pragmatic relations with various Kurdish actors are real and sometimes fraught with risk [1] [2]. Evidence from advocacy, think‑tank and journalistic sources shows both instrumental use of Kurdish solidarity to deflect criticism and longstanding bilateral contacts that yield tangible security and diplomatic benefits [1] [3] [4].
1. What critics mean by “Kurdwashing” and why they say Israel uses it
Left‑wing critics and commentators use the term “Kurdwashing” to describe efforts by Israeli figures to invoke Kurdish suffering or align Israel with Kurdish aspirations as a way to sanitize or distract from Israeli actions elsewhere, a charge leveled explicitly in Jacobin’s critique of public messaging by Netanyahu’s circle [1]. That piece argues prominent Israelis and their allies have repeatedly invoked Kurdish narratives during moments of intense scrutiny—suggesting an intent to reframe public attention away from Gaza by showcasing solidarity with Kurds [1].
2. The concrete channels through which Israel benefits
Beyond rhetoric, Israel has maintained informal, longstanding ties with Kurdish actors that provide geopolitical leverage: historical contacts and periodic support for Kurdish autonomy have created useful informal relationships in Iraq and Syria, which can translate into intelligence, diplomatic footholds and regional influence, as documented in accounts of Israel–Kurdistan Region ties and historical outreach [2] [4]. Think‑tank analysts note that Israel’s interest in Kurdish security aligns with its own border and strategic concerns in a fragmented post‑Arab‑Spring landscape [3].
3. Who pushes the narrative and with what agendas
Pro‑Israel commentators and organizations emphasize Kurdish‑Jewish affinities and mutual security interests, framing support as principled or strategic—positions visible in op‑eds and advocacy groups that stress shared minority‑security narratives and call for Israeli backing of Kurdish protection [5] [6]. Conversely, regional rivals and critics weaponize the “second Israel” trope to delegitimize Kurds and to accuse Israel of covert interference, a long‑standing regional framing noted in both academic and policy commentary [7] [8].
4. Limits and blowback: why Kurdwashing is risky for Israel
Efforts to associate Israel with Kurdish causes can provoke retaliation and diplomatic costs: Turkey and other regional actors have publicly accused Israel of supporting Kurdish forces [3] [9], and Tehran and Baghdad have repeatedly used allegations of Israeli involvement in Kurdish areas to justify strikes or political pressure [4]. Policy analysts warn that overt or even perceived backing of Kurdish autonomy can draw Israel into broader regional disputes and complicate relations with pivotal states [3] [8].
5. Competing interpretations in the sources
Scholars and policy outlets diverge: some argue Israel’s Kurdish outreach is cynical and designed to deflect moral scrutiny amid Gaza [1], while others treat Israeli‑Kurdish ties as historically rooted, strategic, and not simply propaganda [2] [4]. Middle East Forum commentary adds a third angle, claiming regional regimes manipulate Kurdish representation to smear Israel and obscure their own repression—suggesting that accusations of “Kurdwashing” can themselves be politically motivated [10].
6. Bottom line — is Israel benefiting from Kurdwashing?
Yes, to an extent: invoking Kurdish solidarity has yielded reputational and strategic payoffs for some Israeli actors by reframing debates and reminding audiences of Israel’s ties with non‑Arab minorities [1] [2]. But the benefit is neither cost‑free nor uniform—real diplomatic ties and security cooperation underpin some of the rhetoric, while regional backlash and the contested politics of Kurdish representation limit how far such messaging can be exploited without consequences [3] [9] [4]. The available reporting demonstrates both instrumental use of Kurdish narratives and substantive Israel–Kurd connections; assessing motive requires weighing both strands rather than treating the phenomenon as purely cynical or entirely authentic [1] [2].