Kurdistan is an nonreligious state like israel

1. What the question really asks — state identity versus religious demography

The user’s formulation collapses two different things: a state's official constitutional character (is it secular, theocratic, or explicitly religious) and the religious composition or social secularism of its people; available reporting shows Kurdish populations are religiously heterogeneous but numerically dominated by Sunni Islam, so any claim that “Kurdistan” is a nonreligious polity misunderstands both terms ^{[1] [2]}.

2. The religious landscape across greater Kurdistan

Kurdish-inhabited lands span parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria and contain a patchwork of faiths: a Sunni Muslim majority (often Shafi‘i or other Sunni schools), meaningful Shia minorities, Yazidis, Yarsanis (Ahl‑i‑Haqq), Zoroastrians, Christians and historically Jews — making Kurdistan religiously plural rather than nonreligious ^{[1] [4] [2]}.

3. Iraqi Kurdistan’s institutions: minority recognition, not a secular constitution

In the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) the government has taken explicit steps to recognize minority religions — for example a 2015 Law of Minorities granted official representation for Judaism, Zoroastrianism and others in the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs — and the regional parliament reserves seats for various ethnic and religious minorities in broader Iraqi institutions, but these measures are protectionist, not evidence of a formally nonreligious state apparatus ^{[3] [5]}.

4. Social secularism vs. political religion: mixed signals

Some commentators and Kurdish organizations emphasize social tolerance and relatively liberal gender norms compared with neighboring societies, and sources note rising secular, atheist and agnostic currents among Kurds; however, those social trends coexist with strong religious identities for most Kurds and active Islamist political currents in parts of the Kurdish political spectrum, so the idea of a uniformly nonreligious Kurdish polity is unsupported ^{[6] [7] [8]}.

5. The Jewish connection and the Israel comparison — different phenomena

History explains why the Jewish presence in Kurdistan is now small: large-scale migration of Kurdish Jews to Israel in the mid‑20th century left only very small communities or symbolic representation today, and the Kurdish diaspora in Israel is substantial; this historical migration does not make Kurdistan itself nonreligious, nor does it establish equivalence with Israel’s complex identity as a Jewish-majority state with secular institutions — the sources document Jewish migration and diaspora numbers but do not support a claim that Kurdistan functions like a nonreligious version of Israel ^{[9] [3] [10]}.

6. Competing narratives and the elephant in reporting

Different sources emphasize different agendas: Kurdish government and cultural outlets often highlight religious tolerance and pluralism (an implicit nation‑building message), while academic and human‑rights reporting focuses on the numerical predominance of Islam and the vulnerabilities of minorities; both are accurate in their domains, but neither substitutes for a clear constitutional label of “nonreligious state” for Kurdistan, which is not established in the available reporting ^{[7] [5] [2]}.

7. Bottom line and what reporting cannot tell us

Available sources converge on a bottom line: Kurdish regions are religiously diverse but predominantly Muslim; some Kurdish institutions protect minorities and promote tolerance, and many Kurds display secular cultural traits — yet there is no basis in the provided reporting to call Kurdistan a nonreligious state analogous to the user’s vague comparison to Israel. If the question intends a legal/constitutional comparison to Israel’s state identity, the provided material does not supply sufficient documentation about Israel to sustain that specific parallel, and it supplies ample evidence that Kurdistan’s reality is plural, religiously marked, and politically complex ^{[1] [3] [5]}.