What LatAm countries are allies of China and or Russia?
Executive summary
China is the dominant economic partner across much of Latin America—serving as the region’s leading lender and trading partner and deepening political and institutional ties via forums like China‑CELAC—while Russia’s footprint is smaller and more selective, concentrated on old Cold‑War allies such as Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua [1] [2] [3] [4]. Venezuela stands out as the clearest overlapping partner of both Beijing and Moscow, though recent reporting questions how deep or reliable those security ties remain [5] [6] [7].
1. China’s broad economic and diplomatic outreach across the region
Beijing’s engagement with Latin America is primarily economic and institutional: China has become the region’s leading lender and trading partner, expanded people‑to‑people programs and pushed deeper cooperation through mechanisms such as the China‑CELAC process and ministerial joint action plans [1] [2] [8]. Major commodity exporters—Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina—have especially deep commercial ties to China, which is the largest or a top export market for those economies, and Beijing measures influence in part by political support on issues like the One China principle and votes in multilateral fora [9] [3] [2]. That economic weight translates into a wide web of partners rather than a narrow set of “allies”: many LAC governments seek Chinese investment and trade while trying to avoid overtly antagonizing Washington [10] [3].
2. Russia’s focused military and political partnerships
Moscow’s presence in Latin America is far more targeted and militarized: Russia historically concentrates defense and military‑diplomacy ties with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, sponsoring officer exchanges, military education, exercises and even arms transfers that reinforce those regimes’ security sectors [4] [3]. CSIS documentation shows Russia using military diplomacy and events like the International Army Games to cement ties, and its returns to the hemisphere have involved naval visits and weapons diplomacy that resonate most with autocratic governments seeking alternatives to U.S. security relationships [4] [3].
3. Venezuela as the highest‑visibility dual partner—and the limits of that alliance
Venezuela has been the clearest case of alignment with both China and Russia: Beijing funneled loans and infrastructure investment and reportedly supplied military equipment, while Moscow furnished military education and exercises—making Caracas a strategic gateway into the Caribbean for both powers [5] [4] [11]. Yet recent events and expert assessments raise doubts about the durability and depth of those guarantees: reporting and analysts suggest Chinese security promises have practical limits and that both Beijing and Moscow’s ability or willingness to provide robust military or financial rescue may be constrained [6] [7].
4. Cuba and Nicaragua: steady Russian partners, pragmatic Chinese ties
Cuba and Nicaragua remain reliable clients of Russia’s security diplomacy—continuing long‑standing defense and political linkages—while also engaging pragmatically with China for investment and economic cooperation [10] [4] [3]. U.S. policy commentary and think‑tank analysis treat those regimes as the region’s “overtly anti‑U.S.” governments likely to seek assistance from Russia and China, underscoring that Moscow’s role is often political and military, whereas Beijing’s is transactional and economic [10] [3].
5. The middle ground: countries friendly to China but aligned with the U.S.
Several large democracies—most notably Brazil and Argentina—maintain substantial economic ties with China while simultaneously preserving strategic relationships with the United States; Argentina’s government, for example, has curtailed Chinese activities in sensitive sectors even as trade continues [9] [10] [12]. Much of the region fits this “dual engagement” model: pragmatic commercial reliance on China paired with political hedging toward Washington, meaning “ally” in many Latin American capitals is transactional rather than a formal security alignment [1] [3].
6. Contested narratives and geopolitical agendas shaping the labels “ally” or “partner”
Characterizing countries as “allies” of China or Russia is politically freighted: U.S. and Western outlets emphasize security threats and strategic competition, while pro‑Beijing or pro‑Moscow narratives stress sovereignty and economic alternatives—each framing serves an implicit agenda to legitimize pushback or expansion in the hemisphere [12] [8] [13]. Scholarly and journalistic reporting indicates the reality is mixed: China’s sway is broad and economic, Russia’s is narrower and military‑political, and individual countries fall along a spectrum from transactional partners to ideological allies with the axis of authoritarian regimes at the far end [3] [4] [10].