What are the most common types of left-wing and right-wing violence in the US?

1. Summary of the results

Multiple data-driven reviews and comparative studies converge on a clear pattern: right‑wing extremist violence in the United States has been more frequent and deadlier than left‑wing extremist violence in recent decades. Analysts find that right‑wing attacks account for roughly three‑quarters of domestic‑terrorism deaths since 2001 and include high‑fatality episodes such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the Charleston church shooting ^{[1] [2]}. Comparative research further reports that left‑wing actors in the U.S. are generally less likely to carry out lethal attacks, with left‑linked radical acts less often becoming violent; Islamist and some foreign‑informed actors are found in some datasets to be more lethal on average globally ^{[3] [4]}. Scholarly syntheses and news analyses also note shifts within shorter timeframes: some 2025 reporting indicates a decline in right‑wing terror incidents that year while left‑wing incidents rose from a low baseline, though left‑wing attacks remained relatively rare and less deadly overall ^[5]. Taken together, these multiple sources support a pattern where right‑wing violence poses a larger lethal threat domestically, even as both spectrums include violent actors and evolving tactical profiles ^[6].

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The aggregated summaries leave out several points that qualify and complicate the headline comparisons. First, datasets vary in definitions: what counts as “left‑wing” or “right‑wing” violence, lone‑actor versus organized group attacks, and inclusion of racially or religiously motivated crimes can shift counts substantially ^[6]. Second, temporal clustering matters: a few high‑fatality right‑wing events inflate long‑term lethal‑death proportions, while short‑term upticks in left‑wing incidents (noted in 2025 reporting) can reflect specific political cycles or protests rather than durable trends ^[5]. Third, comparative international analyses show different patterns globally, with Islamist extremism producing higher lethality in some datasets; thus U.S. patterns don’t necessarily generalize worldwide ^{[3] [4]}. Finally, methodological differences across studies — selection of timeframes, coding rules for ideology, and casualty thresholds — produce divergent numerical results, so the claim that one side is categorically more violent requires careful qualification of scope, period, and metrics used ^{[1] [4]}.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

Framing the question as “most common types of left‑wing and right‑wing violence” can be used to advance partisan narratives by implying equivalence or by overstating one side’s threat; actors with political motives may benefit from selective emphasis. Sources noting right‑wing predominance ^{[1] [2]} can be portrayed as minimizing left‑wing threats if readers overlook methodological caveats; conversely, highlighting isolated left‑wing upticks ^[5] without context can be used to claim parity with long‑term right‑wing lethality. Advocacy groups and political figures may cherry‑pick recent short‑term trends or specific incidents to support policy goals such as expanded surveillance or law‑enforcement focus on particular movements ^[6]. Because datasets differ in coding and scope, stakeholders with incentives to redirect public concern — from media outlets to policymakers — can selectively cite whichever study best supports their agenda; readers should therefore seek cross‑validated, transparent datasets and clear definitions before drawing policy conclusions ^{[4] [3]}.