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Fact check: How does left wing political violence differ from Right-wing political violence?
Executive Summary
Research published in September 2025 presents two competing narratives: a cluster of analyses finds right‑wing political violence in the United States has been more frequent and deadlier historically, while another set of recent studies reports a rise in left‑wing incidents culminating in 2025 where left‑wing attacks reportedly outnumber those from the far right [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. The evidence base includes trend analyses and event tallies; interpretations diverge depending on the time window, definitions of political violence, and coding choices used by researchers and media outlets [1] [3].
1. Why the Records Tell Different Stories — A Battle Over Definitions
Analysts disagree because the operational definitions of “left‑wing” and “right‑wing” violence and the inclusion criteria for incidents vary across studies, which drives divergent conclusions. Some datasets categorize attacks by ideological motivation, lethality, or organizational affiliation, while others count a wider array of politically motivated assaults and threats; the studies reporting a long‑standing right‑wing predominance emphasize fatalities and sustained campaigns as metrics [3]. Conversely, the recent work claiming an upsurge in left‑wing incidents counts a cluster of lower‑fatality but more numerous attacks between 2016 and 2024, raising the left‑wing total for the recent period [4] [5].
2. The Right‑Wing Predominance Finding: Frequency and Fatality Emphasized
Multiple analyses published in September 2025 document that most documented domestic terrorist deaths in the U.S. since 2001 are attributable to right‑wing extremists, estimating roughly 75–80% of fatalities, with notable high‑casualty events such as Charleston [7] and El Paso [8] shaping that picture [3]. These studies highlight long‑term trends in which right‑wing violence is both more lethal and more recurrent, and they point to enduring networks and radicalization pathways, including online social networks and white‑identitarian ideologies, as sustaining factors [9] [2].
3. The Contrasting Claim: A Recent Rise in Left‑Wing Incidents
A cluster of September 2025 reports and a study cited by media outlets assert that left‑wing attacks increased notably, with 2025 marking a first in over 30 years where left‑wing incidents outnumbered far‑right attacks, citing 37 left‑wing incidents from 2016–2024 and pointing to political polarization around the Trump presidency as a motivating factor [4] [5] [6]. Those sources connect a wave of anti‑government and partisan motivations, and specific episodes including attacks on ICE facilities and targeted violence against conservative figures, to explain the numerical uptick [6].
4. Reconciling the Tension: Time Frames, Lethality, and Coding Choices
The datasets diverge because they emphasize different measures: incident counts versus fatalities, short‑term spikes versus multi‑decadal baselines, and organized group attacks versus lone actors. The right‑wing‑dominant studies use a broad temporal baseline and fatalities as a key metric, producing a narrative of sustained lethality [1] [3]. The left‑rise studies rely on a more recent window and count incidents that are often lower in lethality but higher in frequency during specific years, producing an immediate but potentially transient signal [4] [5].
5. Methodological Caveats and Institutional Framing That Matter
Analysts note that agency definitions and the absence of a formal domestic terrorism designation complicate comparability, and media framing can amplify either trend depending on which dataset is highlighted [1]. Studies rely on open‑source event coding, law‑enforcement reports, and academic databases; small changes in classification (e.g., labeling an attack as politically motivated or as criminal) materially alter results. The September 2025 uptick in left‑wing incident counts warrants scrutiny against alternative codings and verification of intent and linkage to organized currents [2] [4].
6. Who Is Saying What — Possible Agendas and Interpretive Stakes
Different institutions and outlets emphasize narratives that can align with political concerns: those warning of right‑wing dominance stress lethality and historical continuity, often prompting calls for sustained counter‑extremism measures, while reports spotlighting a left‑wing rise emerge amid debates about polarization and policy responses to perceived threats from the extreme left tied to reactions against presidential policies [3] [6]. Each framing serves distinct policy and public‑opinion consequences, underscoring the need to treat findings as data‑dependent claims, not settled facts.
7. Bottom Line — What the Evidence Actually Shows Right Now
As of September 2025, evidence supports two coexisting truths: historically and in cumulative fatality metrics, right‑wing extremist violence has been dominant and deadlier in the U.S.; simultaneously, recent event‑level counts by some researchers indicate an increase in left‑wing incidents in the 2016–2024 window, producing a temporary numerical edge in certain tallies [3] [4]. Understanding which trend matters for policy requires clarifying whether the priority is reducing fatalities, addressing rising incident frequency, or countering specific organizing dynamics — decisions that depend on the metric chosen and on continued monitoring and transparent methodology [1] [3].