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Fact check: Violance left wing v right wing in 2024 and 2025
Executive Summary
Studies from late 2025 document a shift in the raw count of politically motivated attacks in the United States, with recent research finding that left-wing incidents outnumbered far-right attacks for the first time in over 30 years—but experts warn this is a narrow, potentially transient signal shaped by small numbers and data limitations [1] [2]. Critics emphasize that right-wing violence historically produced more fatalities and remains a durable threat, so interpreting a short-term change in counts as a durable reversal is premature [3] [4].
1. Why a headline claims the left has "overtaken" the right — and what that actually measures
Recent reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and affiliated researchers quantify incidents and plots and report that 41 left-wing attacks since 2016 compare to 152 far-right attacks over the same period, and that 2025 saw more recorded left-wing plots than right-wing ones in early months [1] [5]. These studies count discrete attacks and plots as the principal metric; that approach can show short-term shifts in activity levels. Counting incidents emphasizes frequency, not lethality or organizational reach, so the numbers alone do not capture the full public-safety impact of violent extremism.
2. The small-numbers problem: why five versus one matters less than it looks
Analysts critical of the CSIS work highlight that the observed 2025 swing—five left-wing incidents versus one right-wing incident in early 2025—is statistically fragile because these totals are very small and sensitive to classification choices or single events [4]. When incident counts are low, individual prosecutions, thwarted plots, or reporting changes can produce large percentage swings, so short-term comparisons can exaggerate trends. Critics thus urge caution and call for longer time windows and standardized case definitions to assess whether changes reflect real shifts in mobilization.
3. Fatalities and lethality: historical context shows right-wing harm remains large
Multiple analyses underscore that although counts may have shifted briefly, right-wing attacks historically account for more deaths and severe incidents in the U.S., a pattern that has persisted despite recent variations in incident counts [3] [2]. This distinction between frequency and lethality matters for policy and public perception because a smaller number of high-fatality attacks can produce far more harm than many low-casualty incidents. Evaluating threat requires both incident counts and outcomes such as fatalities, injuries, and infrastructure disruption.
4. Possible drivers offered by researchers — and competing interpretations
Report authors suggest several explanations for the apparent 2025 decline in right-wing incidents, including political changes following the 2024 election and shifts in mobilization or enforcement that may have reduced activity or prevented plots [5] [4]. Critics counter that such causal links are speculative: correlation with political events does not prove causation, and methodological differences in how groups are coded or how plots are discovered can drive apparent trends. The debate highlights how analysts’ choices shape conclusions and why transparency about methods matters.
5. Methodology disputes: the debate over labeling and data collection
Scholars point to classification challenges—deciding when an act is “left-wing,” “right-wing,” or motivated by non-ideological grievance—and to inconsistent data collection across agencies and researchers, which complicates comparisons [4]. The CSIS work and its critics agree that domestic terrorism datasets are imperfect; differences in inclusion criteria, timeframes, and source material can materially change headline findings. Calls for standardized protocols and sharing of adjudicated case files reflect efforts to reduce these disagreements.
6. What leading analysts warn policymakers and the public to avoid
Experts from competing perspectives converge on one practical warning: don’t treat one year or one study as definitive evidence of a long-term reversal in extremist risk [2] [4]. Policymakers should weigh both frequency and lethality, invest in transparent data systems, and guard against politicized narratives that overread short-term shifts. Maintaining diverse counterterrorism capacities addresses multiple threat vectors, acknowledging that either side’s activity can escalate or recede quickly depending on broader social and political dynamics.
7. What is missing from current public discussions and why it matters
Public debate often privileges headline counts while glossing over context such as geographic concentration, group networks, command-and-control structures, and whether incidents were thwarted by law enforcement [4] [1]. Those omitted elements govern operational risk and policy response; counting alone cannot inform whether communities face sustained organized threats or episodic, localized violence. Improving public understanding requires releasing more detailed, anonymized case-level data and methodological transparency so journalists and analysts can assess whether trends are substantive or artefacts.
8. Bottom line for readers tracking political violence through 2024–2025
The best-supported conclusion from the cited analyses is that 2025 produced a notable, if narrow, uptick in recorded left-wing incidents relative to right-wing incidents, but this does not overturn decades of evidence that right-wing extremists have caused more lethal domestic terrorism in the U.S. [1] [3]. Observers should treat the finding as a signal worth monitoring, not a definitive realignment: policy and public attention should remain proportionate, data-driven, and attentive to both incident counts and the severity and organization behind violent acts.