What trade deals has marc carney personally negotiated or approved as prime minister of canada and when?
Executive summary
As prime minister, Mark Carney has personally announced and signed a small number of concrete agreements and initiated several trade negotiations aimed at diversifying Canada’s export markets since taking office in 2025; the clearest, documented actions are a new bilateral trade agreement with Indonesia announced in September 2025, the signing of a Canada–UAE Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) in November 2025, and the initiation of free-trade talks with Thailand announced at APEC in November 2025 [1] [2] [3].
1. Signed agreements: Indonesia (announced September 2025) and Canada–UAE FIPA (signed November 2025)
The federal record shows Carney publicly announcing a new bilateral trade agreement with Indonesia — described as Canada’s first bilateral trade agreement with an ASEAN country and intended to cut or eliminate tariffs on over 95% of current Canadian exports to Indonesia — with that announcement dated to September 2025 in government communications [1]. Separately, during his November 2025 Middle East mission Carney and the UAE president signed a Canada–UAE Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), a treaty-style instrument to provide protections and predictability for investors that Ottawa says will unlock bilateral investment [2].
2. Negotiations launched: Thailand and Canada–ASEAN discussions (initiated late 2025; ASEAN FTA talks ongoing)
On the negotiating front, Carney publicly announced the initiation of free-trade negotiations with Thailand during APEC in late October/early November 2025 — a formal start rather than a concluded deal [3]. He also accelerated work toward a Canada–ASEAN free trade agreement during an October 2025 ASEAN visit, with the government framing those talks as anticipated to conclude in 2026, meaning these are active, multilateral negotiation processes rather than completed treaties [1].
3. Broader outreach and “in-progress” trade diplomacy: China, India, EU/CPTPP linkages, Qatar outreach
Carney has framed a series of high-level diplomatic engagements as trade diplomacy without documented final agreements: meetings with Chinese and Indian leaders aimed at resolving “irritants” and restarting talks were reported as part of his travel schedule and trade strategy, but contemporary reporting makes clear progress was described as “expect[ed] to produce progress” rather than definitive tariff removals or concluded deals [4] [5] [6]. He has also promoted an agenda to link CPTPP and EU markets and to explore critical-minerals and energy cooperation in discussions at the G20 and bilateral meetings, positioning these as pathways to later trade and investment arrangements [7] [6]. A planned visit to Qatar in January 2026 was announced as commercial outreach rather than a pact-signing [8].
4. What has not happened: no concluded comprehensive U.S. tariff deal and paused bilateral talks with Washington
While Carney has travelled widely to diversify markets, reporting notes Ottawa’s bilateral tariff negotiations with the United States stalled and remain on hold pending U.S. political signals; Carney himself said talks with the U.S. would resume “when it’s appropriate,” and commentators observed that Canada’s bilateral work with Washington was likely to be subsumed by trilateral North American processes — in short, no new U.S.–Canada tariff relief deal was concluded in this period [6] [9] [10].
5. Political context, criticisms and competing readings
Critics argue that an outsized focus on rapid diversification and outreach — including deeper engagement with nations such as the UAE and India — risks ideological or geopolitical tradeoffs and that Ottawa needs greater transparency about tradeoffs for workers if U.S. talks are deprioritized [9] [6]. Supporters point to the signed UAE FIPA and Indonesia agreement as concrete wins that align with the stated goal of doubling non‑U.S. exports and attracting investment [2] [1] [7]. Sources from government press releases naturally foreground Carney’s role; independent outlets emphasize both the symbolic value of high‑level meetings (China, India, UAE) and the reality that many initiatives remain negotiations rather than finished deals [4] [11].
6. Reporting limits and what remains unclear
Public sources supplied here document the announced Indonesia agreement, the signed UAE FIPA, and the launch of Thailand negotiations, but do not provide full treaty texts, ratification status, or detailed timetables for implementation; nor do they show that Carney personally negotiated every clause — press releases attribute leadership and announcements to the prime minister while negotiation teams and ministers typically drive technical negotiations [1] [2] [3]. Where reporting describes “progress” or “expected” conclusions (China engagement, ASEAN FTA), it stops short of showing completed, enforceable trade deals [1] [4].