What mechanisms have African Union and regional mediators used to monitor DRC‑Rwanda ceasefire commitments since 2024?
Executive summary
African Union and regional mediators since 2024 relied primarily on ad‑hoc, regionally driven verification bodies born of the Luanda Process and complemented by quadripartite and international observer arrangements to monitor the DRC–Rwanda ceasefire . These mechanisms combined a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), border‑post launches and ministerial oversight with outside observers (Qatar, US, AU, ICGLR) but repeatedly encountered problems of non‑participation, contested mandates and battlefield violations, notably by M23 .
1. Ad‑Hoc Verification Mechanism: the Luanda Process’ technical backbone
The principal monitoring apparatus called for in the August 2024 ceasefire was the Ad‑Hoc Verification Mechanism created under the Angola‑facilitated Luanda Process, intended to be the formal body to track implementation of the 4 August agreement . Technical experts from both DRC and Rwanda developed a Concept of Operations to spell out verification tasks and procedures, and a reinforced version of the Ad‑Hoc Verification Mechanism was launched publicly at a Goma border post in November 2024 in the presence of foreign ministers from Angola, the DRC and Rwanda, signaling regional ownership .
2. Quadripartite and joint mechanisms: proposals to broaden monitoring membership
The AU Peace and Security Council considered calls to establish a joint mechanism within a “quadripartite framework” to monitor the ceasefire, reflecting proposals to widen verification beyond a bilateral technical cell to include regional actors and to reinforce respect for DRC sovereignty [1]. The PSC repeatedly urged formation of monitoring mechanisms tied to the Luanda outcomes and highlighted the need for follow‑up mechanisms to neutralize armed groups such as the FDLR as part of verification and implementation efforts [1].
3. CONOPS, operational launches and the limits of implementation
A concrete monitoring toolkit emerged in the form of the CONOPS that defined withdrawal, disengagement and verification steps; its operationalization was presented as the basis for international follow‑up and potential sanctions for non‑compliance . Despite this, key implementation gaps were exposed: Rwanda committed in the CONOPS to withdraw troops and to provide experts to the verification mechanism, yet UN and Security Council reporting noted that Rwandan expert members had not taken up their duties in the mandated mechanism .
4. International observers, parallel processes and Doha’s emergence
As the Luanda mediation met setbacks, other venues—most notably Doha—moved to establish separate ceasefire monitoring frameworks involving the DRC, M23 and regional representatives, with the AU, Qatar and the United States positioned as observers to those talks and to nascent monitoring bodies . Doha’s processes produced a distinct ceasefire‑monitoring mechanism and agreements on prisoner exchanges with observer participation, underscoring a shift toward multi‑track monitoring alongside AU/regional efforts .
5. Who monitors the monitors? UN, PSC and sanctions diplomacy
The AU and regional mediators did not operate in isolation: the AU’s PSC and the UN Security Council kept the mechanisms under political review, linking monitoring outcomes to public condemnations, calls for withdrawal of foreign forces and consideration of targeted measures against violators . Security Council briefings and PSC summit statements framed the verification mechanisms as essential but stressed that battlefield breaches—principally M23 advances—undermined monitoring legitimacy and required stronger international pressure .
6. Structural weaknesses, contested legitimacy and competing agendas
Despite formal mechanisms, monitoring was hamstrung by contested participation (Rwanda’s experts failing to deploy), the absence of consensus over MONUSCO’s role—rejected by some rebel actors—and competing mediator agendas as Angola’s Luanda facilitation, US‑led Washington initiatives and Qatar’s Doha talks overlapped, creating parallel verification architectures with differing mandates and legitimacy claims . These dynamics exposed implicit agendas: Angola sought regional de‑escalation under its mediation, Qatar promoted direct DRC–M23 fixes with international observers, and external powers used monitoring architecture to advance strategic influence and sanctions leverage .
Conclusion: monitoring on paper, fragile in practice
Since 2024 the AU and regional mediators established technical verification mechanisms, CONOPS and joint frameworks under the Luanda Process and sought to complement them with quadripartite and international observer arrangements, while new Doha‑led bodies added layers of monitoring; yet operational shortfalls, non‑deployment of experts, continuing M23 offensives and overlapping mediator platforms have kept monitoring fragile and the ceasefire effectively unsecure .