Can mid cycle redistricting be used as a partisan tool to influence election outcomes?

1. Summary of the results

The analyses provided suggest that mid-cycle redistricting can indeed be used as a partisan tool to influence election outcomes ^{[1] [2]}. This is evident in the cases of Texas and North Carolina, where Republican lawmakers have redrawn congressional maps to their advantage ^{[1] [2]}. However, it is also noted that the constraints on state authority to engage in mid-cycle redistricting come from the states themselves, whether through state constitutional provisions, state court decisions, or statutes ^[1]. The use of advanced computer algorithms has made gerrymandering more egregious, with states like Texas and Florida taking advantage of this to create districts that favor their party ^[3]. Some sources also highlight the efforts of Democratic leaders in states like California to gerrymander congressional districts to counter the efforts of Republican-led states ^[4]. The Supreme Court's 2019 ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause has given states increasingly unfettered power in redistricting, which could lead to increased use of mid-decade redistricting as a partisan tool ^[5]. Key points to consider include:

• The potential for mid-cycle redistricting to be used as a partisan tool ^{[1] [2]}
• The constraints on state authority to engage in mid-cycle redistricting ^[1]
• The impact of the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause ^[5]
• The use of advanced computer algorithms in gerrymandering ^[3]

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

Some missing context in the original statement includes the historical context of mid-cycle redistricting, which has been extremely uncommon, with only two states voluntarily redrawing their congressional maps between censuses for partisan advantage since 1970 ^[6]. Additionally, the role of state courts in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims under their own constitutions is an important aspect to consider ^[7]. Alternative viewpoints include the idea that states may undertake efforts to de-politicize the process by setting up independent commissions, as suggested by Richard Pildes, an expert in election law at New York University School of Law ^[5]. Other viewpoints to consider include:

• The potential benefits of independent commissions in reducing partisanship in redistricting ^[5]
• The impact of mid-cycle redistricting on minority representation and voting rights (not explicitly mentioned in the analyses)
• The role of federal courts in regulating partisanship in redistricting, despite the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling ^[5]

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original statement may be biased towards highlighting the potential for mid-cycle redistricting to be used as a partisan tool, without fully considering the constraints on state authority and the historical context of mid-cycle redistricting ^{[1] [6]}. Additionally, the statement may overlook the potential benefits of independent commissions in reducing partisanship in redistricting, as suggested by some sources ^[5]. The statement may also underestimate the role of state courts in adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims under their own constitutions ^[7]. Those who benefit from this framing include:

• Partisan groups seeking to redraw congressional maps to their advantage ^{[1] [2]}
• States with Republican legal control, which have sent more Republicans to Congress since the 2000 redistricting cycle ^[8]
• Advocates for independent commissions, who may see the potential for mid-cycle redistricting to be used as a partisan tool as a reason to support their cause ^{[5] [8] [5] [3]}