What does post‑election verification in Minnesota show about the rate of improper registrations tied to vouching?
Executive summary
Post‑election verification in Minnesota shows that vouching is a rare mechanism — used in under 0.6% of votes in the 2024 general election — and that the bulk of vouching cases involved voters who were already on the rolls but had moved and not updated their address (about 71%); state officials say vetting of vouchers and vouched‑for registrants occurs after elections and that detected fraudulent registration attempts were referred to law enforcement with no ballots cast as a result [1] [2] [3]. At the same time, federal prosecutors have demanded access to 22 months of records because the Justice Department remains concerned about the possibility of improper registrations through vouching, and public reporting does not contain a definitive, independently audited percentage of registrations proven improper after post‑election review [4] [5].
1. How common is vouching in Minnesota, and what do the numbers say?
Minnesota’s public figures make vouching look small in scale: statewide data cited by the Secretary of State and multiple outlets show fewer than 0.6% of votes cast in the November 2024 general election relied on vouching, and roughly 71% of those vouched registrants were already registered but had not updated their address — meaning most uses were address updates rather than brand‑new registrations [2] [6] [1]. The Secretary of State’s office also emphasizes that vouching has been part of Minnesota law for decades and that a voucher must sign an affidavit under penalty of perjury [1] [7].
2. What does post‑election verification actually do, and what has it found?
According to state officials, information on vouchers and the people they vouch for is entered into the statewide database and verified after each election; local election officials reported inconsistencies to law enforcement and coordinated with the FBI, saying fraudulent registration attempts were detected and that no ballots were requested or cast from those fraudulent attempts [2] [3]. The state’s guidance and statutes require the oath be attached to the registration application and instruct counties to use verification tools built into the voter registration system [7] [3]. Democracy Docket and Minnesota election pages echo that vouched registrants are recorded and subject to later verification and potential perjury prosecution [6] [1].
3. Where are the data gaps — why can’t reporters give a single “improper‑vouching” rate?
Reporting to date establishes how many used vouching and that many were prior registrants, but it does not publish a clear, independently audited tally of how many vouched registrations were later judged improper and led to charges or removals. The DOJ’s demand for detailed digital records for the prior 22 months implicitly acknowledges gaps that federal officials want to examine [4] [8]. Advocacy and legal briefs allege post‑election rules permit verification only after ballots are cast, raising concerns about a window for abuse, but those critiques do not provide an overall numeric improper‑rate proven by statewide audit [9] [10].
4. Competing narratives and their incentives
Federal civil‑rights lawyers have framed the records request as enforcement of HAVA and NVRA and a necessary probe into potential vulnerabilities tied to vouching [4] [8], while state officials and voting‑rights advocates stress the rarity of vouching and the built‑in perjury affidavit and post‑election checks that protect the rolls [1] [6]. Critics and some commentators argue rules expand “unlimited vouching” in certain facilities and point to past localized incidents as proof of risk — those voices press for reform and federal oversight [10] [9]. Each actor gains something from their framing: federal authorities assert enforcement prerogatives; state officials defend decentralized election administration and public trust; reformers seek legal or statutory changes.
5. Bottom line — what post‑election verification shows about improper vouching
Available, cited reporting supports a firm bottom line that vouching was used very rarely in 2024 and that the majority of vouched cases were address updates, not first‑time registrations, and that Minnesota’s post‑election systems flagged and referred suspected fraudulent registration attempts to law enforcement with claims that no fraudulent ballots were counted [2] [1] [3]. What cannot be stated with certainty from the public reporting provided is a single, statewide numeric rate of vouched registrations later adjudicated as improper after verification — the DOJ’s records demand and ongoing scrutiny reflect both the perceived risk and the current limits of publicly available, consolidated audit data [4] [5].