What was the chain of command for National Guard deployment during the January 6 Capitol attack?
Executive summary
The immediate authority to request National Guard assistance at the U.S. Capitol rested with the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police chief, but the D.C. National Guard could not deploy to the Capitol without approval from Army civilian leadership—ultimately the Secretary of the Army or the acting Secretary of Defense under special rules for the District—creating multiple supervisory layers that delayed on-the-ground movement [1] [2] [3]. Conflicting accounts and concerns about “optics,” plus restrictive memos issued days earlier, meant guard commanders sought permission up the chain rather than self-deploying, and the first substantial Guard presence arrived hours after the breach [4] [5] [6].
1. The formal legal and procedural chain: Capitol Police Board to Army leadership
By law the Capitol Police Board—composed of the House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol—has the authority to request National Guard assistance for the Capitol, and the Capitol Police chief can seek that Board authorization, but a D.C. National Guard deployment into the District required approval by Army civilian officials (Secretary of the Army / acting Secretary) and coordination with the Department of Defense, not unilateral local action [1] [2] [3].
2. How requests were made on January 6: Sund, the sergeants-at-arms, and “running it up the chain”
Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund repeatedly requested emergency authority to call the Guard as the mob overwhelmed police; Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul Irving and Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael Stenger who said they would “run it up the chain,” and those requests were not granted immediately—accounts show Sund lobbied the Board for authorization and was not granted it for over an hour [3] [6] [1].
3. The D.C. National Guard commander’s position and the “standby” orders
Major General William Walker, commander of the D.C. National Guard, mobilized guardsmen to buses and prepared them to move, but repeatedly received “standby” guidance from Army staff and did not receive final deployment approval until late afternoon; notes and timelines show the Guard prepared forces while awaiting formal authorization from the Secretary of the Army and senior DoD advisors [2] [3] [4].
4. Pentagon and Army staff roles: advice, approvals, and concerns about optics
Army staff on a conference call advised Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy and others that they could not recommend immediate approval—reports quote Army staff saying they “didn’t like the visual” of Guardsmen on the Capitol steps—creating friction between military judgment and the urgency on the ground; the Army’s staff-level reluctance and repeated holding actions were factors in the delayed authorization [7] [4] [2].
5. Acting civilian leadership and preexisting deployment restrictions
Memos issued days before January 6 by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller and Army leadership imposed tighter controls on D.C. Guard deployments, requiring higher-level permission for operations around the Capitol; Major General Walker said he contemplated deploying without formal approval but was constrained by those directives and the formal approval process [5] [8] [2].
6. When presidential authority mattered—and who actually gave final orders
The Select Committee and Department of Defense reporting note that the President had the authority to direct Guard deployment in D.C. but did not issue orders on January 6; instead, final approval to move significant Guard forces came from acting Defense/Army civilian leadership in the afternoon, after congressional leaders and others pressed Pentagon officials [9] [5] [2].
7. Conflicting accounts, resignations, and lessons about accountability
Officials who were on calls and in the Board later disputed timelines and responsibilities—both Sergeants at Arms and Chief Sund resigned—and multiple inquiries (House committee, DoD inspector general, press timelines) reached somewhat different emphases about whether delay was deliberate or procedural; the prevailing conclusion in several official reports is that structural complexity, caution about optics, and restrictive orders combined to slow deployment rather than a single rogue refusal [1] [5] [6].
Conclusion
The chain of command on January 6 ran from the Capitol Police chief and Police Board asking for Guard help to D.C. National Guard leadership preparing forces but requiring formal authorization from Army civilian leaders and DoD advisors; that multilayered process—reinforced by preexisting memos, concerns raised on Pentagon calls about optics, and disputed recollections—meant Guardsmen could not be committed to repelling the breach until senior civilian approval arrived hours after the attack began [3] [2] [4] [5].